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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore the extend of trade misinvoicing among OECD countries over the period 2006-
2016. Following the standard approach developed by Morgenstern (1950), four categories of misreported 
bilateral transactions are estimated to highlight two channels used to shift illicit financial flows. The study 
is reinforced by an analysis in terms of bilateral intensity indices proposed by Kojima (1964) and extended 
by Kunimoto (1977) to determine trends and patterns in trade misinvoicing among bilateral relations for 
selected OECD countries. Some interesting findings can be pointed out: (i) the assessment of intra-OECD 
misinvoicing trade shows that the accumulated amount reaches more than 12 trillion US dollars over the 
period and is characterised by illicit inflows, although outflows tend to increase during the last years; (ii) 
significant amounts of illicit financial flows occur in the most advanced countries despite the quality of 
their statistical recording services; (iii) arguing against explanation based on tax evasion and capital flight, 
it is shown that countries with high GDP per capita are senders and recipients of illicit financial flows, 
while lower GDP per capita countries are also receivers of illicit inflows; (iv) the share of misreported 
imports in countries´ total imports is larger than for total exports, which seems to indicate that imports 
are the principal vehicle sustaining bilateral misinvoicing trade; and (v) geographical proximity appears to 
be an important factor in determining the channel used and the direction of illicit financial flows as well 
as in describing intense relations relative to bilateral misinvoicing trade. 
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1. Introduction 
The significance of trade misinvoicing has gained increasing interest, in recent years, as likely to 
provide further insights into the scale of illicit financial flows (hereafter IFFs) and its implications 
in terms of lost revenues, within the scope of the current global agenda on financing for 
development and domestic resource mobilization. Most empirical studies are thus focused on 
analysing estimates of illicit outflows of capital, through import over-invoicing and export under-
invoicing, from developing countries vis-à-vis their developed-country trade partners and/or the 
rest of the world, often regarded as broad aggregates.  
In doing so, it is noteworthy to highlight that the methodology hitherto followed neglects part 
of crucial information: (i) by targeting only certain components of trade misinvoicing; (ii) by 
limiting the analysis to trade between developing and developed countries; (iii) and by 
proceeding on the basis of ad hoc assumptions, including no-misinvoicing behaviour 
demonstrated by developed countries as supposedly declaring their trade data properly. 
In an attempt to address these shortcomings and to adopt a more nuanced approach, this paper 
aims to determine significant patterns and trends as a result of trade misinvoicing in the specific 
context of OECD countries1, over the period 2006–2016. OECD countries, as a whole, play an 
important role on the international trade scene and exert a great influence on this matter. In 
addition, comprising mostly developed countries, it should be expected that one main feature 
would be minor discrepancies related to trade data as their respective statistical systems are 
transparent, accurate and homogenized.  
The extent of misinvoicing relative to imports and exports is estimated through a country-by-
country comparison of discrepancies in mirror trade data, sourced from the UN COMTRADE 
database, carried out annually for each trading partner (i.e. 13,090 bilateral flows). These 
estimates are used to rank countries’ participation in both the total size of export/import 
misinvoicing, which allows to identify the main leading countries. In particular, two channels are 
highlighted depending on whether import and export values are understated or overstated. 
Observed discrepancies in trade data are also analysed by development levels and growth 
dynamics. The latter allows to classify OECD countries according to misinvoicing practices and 
to identify some major regularities over the studied period. 
The methodology developed to measure trade misinvoicing, in the context of intra-OECD trade, 
is also used to adapt a bilateral intensity index aimed to assess how intense are specific relations 
between countries in terms of IFFS. In particular, the cases of Germany, Japan, Mexico and the 
United States are analysed with their more “intense” trading partners.  
At an aggregated level, major findings tend to support substantial illicit financial inflows 
generated within the OECD associated to a recent trend pointing to an increase in illicit outflows. 
As expressed in proportion of import and export values as registered by each country, trade 
misinvoicing tend to be driven by the import side regardless GDP per capita levels. At a country-
level, major developed economies are top-ranked relative to amounts of trade misinvoicing, 
with the exception of Mexico. In addition, bilateral intensity indexes are suggesting intense 
                                                          
1 The OECD currently comprises 35 full members which are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic 
of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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relations either from the export or import side, as demonstrating potential geographical bias in 
trade misinvoicing between certain countries.  
This paper contributes to the evolving debate on the issue of trade misinvoicing in several ways: 
(i) to our knowledge, there are no empirical papers focused on OECD countries; (ii) it allows an 
analysis of trade between developing countries, developing and developed countries, and 
between developed countries; (iii) pairwise comparisons are assessed; (iv) the four types of 
trade misinvoicing are taking into account; (v) developed/advanced countries are also assumed 
to manipulate trade invoices; and (vi) specific trade indicators are adapted to provide insights in 
terms of trends, shares, structure and intensities relative to trade misinvoicing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly some major findings 
from the existing literature on data discrepancies and trade misinvoicing. Section 3 presents the 
two standard approaches to measure the extent of trade misinvoicing and the bilateral intensity 
in trade misinvoicing relationships. In addition, data used for the purpose of this paper are 
discussed. In Section 4, findings are detailed at an aggregated and country levels. Section 5 
proposes a discussion on specific cases of bilateral intensity related to trade misinvoicing. The 
final section concludes with additional comments for further developments.  
2. Data discrepancies and trade misinvoicing: A brief overview  
Trade misinvoicing results from illegal and criminal behaviors aimed to deliberately manipulate 
trade statistics, i.e. by undervaluing or overvaluing values of exports and imports. The standard 
approach used to detect this kind of practices relies on partner-country comparisons through 
analysis of mirror trade data. In this respect, within a “perfect world”, exports (imports) of 
country i to country j, as declared by country i, are equal to imports from i (exports to i) as 
reported by country j, after making necessary adjustments since imports are valued on a c.i.f. 
basis (cost, insurance and freight) and exports in f.o.b (free on board). 
Discrepancies between valuations of the same merchandise flow reported by both countries 
allow the identification of potential trade misinvoicing, although presenting some limitations. 
As stated by the UN Trade Statistics Branch, they do not reflect the exact reality, and the results 
of their processing need to be taken with cautious. Nitsch (2012) presents a comprehensive 
analysis on possible inconsistencies in mirror trade statistics.  
Such discrepancies have raised a lot of concerns about the accuracy of trade statistics2. Since 
the seminal work of Morgensten (1950), likely causes of disparities in reported trade statistics 
have been extensively acknowledged and can be classified into two broad categories. Although 
transportation costs tend to appear as the main explanation of such disparities (as unavoidable 
factors), the magnitude of observed gaps points to other factors in determining the mismatch 
of reported bilateral data, apart from the sole transportation costs.  
The first one is related to structural differences between countries due to the registration of 
commodities (uniformity in data compilation methodology, non-compliance of statistical 
coverage, misclassification of goods and destination, geographical definition and indication of 
trading partners). To address these issues, Hamanaka (2012) has proposed a multiple mirror 
data method to identify misclassification. As noticed by Federico and Tena (1991), these errors 
could be eliminated by standardization and international cooperation.  
                                                          
2 In this sense, asymmetries in reported bilateral statistics, between a country and its trading partners, 
might jeopardize the relevance of any results achieved by empirical or econometric analysis, upon which 
policy-makers will ultimately need to base their decision.  
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The second category comprises errors made by national statistical offices and international 
agencies such as the use of domestic rather than international prices, the choice of an exchange 
rate other than the one prevailing at the time of payment or the absence of data. Time lags 
effect due to maritime shipments, especially at the end of the fiscal year, introduce bias between 
the country and its partners. However, it is important to stress that such bias is marginal when 
considering annual data.  
Following Morgenstern (1950, 1965), the related-literature has largely adopted these sources of 
discrepancies in trade data. Nevertheless, as defined by Morgenstern (1965, p.141), the last 
cause combines “inability (or unwillingness) of importers and especially exporters to furnish 
accurate information”. As a result, the unwillingness to report “true” values of imports and 
exports may thus explain significantly observed gaps in bilateral trade statistics. Interestingly, 
this last point has possibly induced confusion or misinterpretation in recent studies on trade 
misinvoicing, by putting at the same level inability and unwillingness.  
First, it can be stressed that inability is linked to the statistical structure itself (e.g. lack of related-
skills and/or resources) while unwillingness is inherent to criminal behaviours of individuals or 
firms making a deliberate choice. Consequently, this confusion or misinterpretation tends to 
assimilate the incentives for deliberate distortions and the motives of bilateral data 
discrepancies. In doing so, a large strand of the literature on trade misinvoicing has generally 
assumed fraud as a given fact, instead of analysing criminal behaviours to provide appropriate 
recommendations on this matter. 
Second, given that advanced countries have the ability to record properly their trade data, it 
leads to assume de facto that “no-misinvoicing” can occur in that regard (see Hong and Pak, 
2017). With this confusion in mind, statistics provided by developed countries are more reliable 
than those reported by developing countries3. As a result, numerous studies have analysed 
bilateral trade between developed and developing countries and, based on this “no-
misinvoicing” assumption, have interpreted misinvoicing practices as coming from developing 
countries (see Tandon and Rao, 2017). 
Finally, mirror-import flows reported by trading partners are assumed to be more consistent 
due to an easier identification of merchandise provenance and higher controls since customs 
services are supposed to register imports with more caution for, inter alia, tariffs and regulatory 
purposes. According to the FATF (2006, p.2), customs services are monitoring “less than 5% of 
all cargo shipments entering or leaving their jurisdictions”. In addition, export statistics seem to 
be less reliable due to the willingness to exploit subsidy regime, as recently drawing researchers’ 
attention4 and leaving aside specific issues on IFFs. 
As argued by Linsi and Mügge (2017), although statistical systems have improved during the 
20th century, at the age of global data, increasing globalization driven by transnational 
corporations and the use of offshore financial centres tends to undermine the quality of 
economic statistics, with serious implications for economic policy and academic research. 
                                                          
3 Nitsch (2016) is suggesting, among others, that trade statistics of developed countries are more accurate 
than those of developing countries, due to better quality of national statistics services and smaller 
incentives for misinvoicing in trade. 
4 See Bhagwati (1967), Gupta et al. (2012). 
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Consequently, beyond unintentional errors due to structural and logistical issues, the analysis of 
mirror trade data can reveal other inconsistencies resulting from deliberate misreporting for 
fraudulent purposes by under- or overstating values of imports and exports5.  
When reviewing the extensive literature relative to trade misinvoicing, four distinct phases can 
be distinguished given the specific topic debated to provide further insights into this issue. 
Originally conceived in the 1960s and 1970s, the first phase has established the theoretical and 
empirical foundations for analysis on this matter, as demonstrated by the successive writings of 
Bhagwati. The second, drawn up during the 1980s and 1990s, is essentially intended to improve 
the understanding of interlinkages between trade misinvoicing and illicit capital flights.6 The 
third phase has initiated around the 2000s focusing on practices as regards trade-based money 
laundering (e.g. de Boyrie et al., 2005a), while the final phase in the last ten years underlines 
development financing issues related to trade misinvoicing and IFFs, as highlighted by target 
16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals.  
The most commonly reason advanced to misreport trade data arises from seeking to evade 
tariffs and taxes. In this context, Bhagwati (1964) has shown that import taxes may determine 
practices of under-valued imports for the case of Turkey. Fisman and Wei (2004) have shown a 
strong correlation between tariffs, smuggling and “missing imports” in the case of China. 
Furthermore, Buehn and Eicher (2011) have carried out empirical tests into microeconomic 
determinants of import and export misinvoicing, finding evidence for tariffs and black-market 
premium. However, they did not find strong results for punishment costs and fines, leading them 
to conclude, accordantly with their theoretical framework, that an enforcement of penalties 
should deter trade misinvoicing. On the contrary, Patnaik et al. (2012) have evidenced that 
tariffs and trade barriers are less persuasive in the case of emerging economies. 
Nevertheless, in our case, a major part of OECD countries is members of the European Union or 
the NAFTA and benefit from preferential trade agreements, invalidating the tariffs explanation 
for misinvoicing. However, malpractices are an important explanation for discrepancies in trade 
data. Smuggling and illegal traded goods represent a substantial share of misinvoicing (Fisman 
and Wei, 2009). For example, the value added tax fraud in intra-European trade may explain a 
significant part of data discrepancies in intra-EU trade (Nitsch, 2012). 
Numerous studies on trade misinvoicing have focused on the issue of capital flight which have 
included only undervalued exports and overvalued imports within the four potential 
components of misinvoicing, thus ignoring the issue of illicit financial inflows (see for instance 
de Boyrie et al., 2005b). 
In addition, it should be noted that trade-based money laundering is one of the most used 
practice for moving illicit capitals and reintegrating them into the formal economy (FATF, 2006). 
Although assessments made by de Boyrie et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2007) and Zdanowicz (2007) 
seem to be overestimated, they do provide an interesting view on the magnitude of illegal 
money moved by commodity transactions. According to Berger and Nitsch (2008), as well as 
Shaar (2017), high levels of corruption can also explain discrepancies in trade data.  
                                                          
5 Each category of trade misinvoicing is defined in section 3. 
6 See for example, J.K. Boyce and L. Zarsky (1988). “Capital flight from the Philippines, 1962-1986.”, 
Journal of Philippine Development, XV (2), p.191-222. 
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As a result, many studies on misinvoicing trade have focused on trade between developed and 
developing countries,7 assuming that reporter´s statistics are accurate while discrepancies are 
attributed to the less developed partner, as mentioned previously. 
To sum up, practices of trade misinvoicing seem to prevail in developing countries while 
developed countries are supposed to have resolved such practices through accurate reported 
data and transparent statistical systems. In addition, import flows are more reliable to detect 
trade misinvoicing as using the mirror-data technique. The related-literature has mostly focused 
on trade misinvoicing and IFFs by identifying specific motivations related to duty avoidance, tax 
evasion, capital flight and money laundering. However, we will see that, in the case of OECD 
countries, some inferences made a priori may not be supported by the estimated outcomes 
presented hereafter (see sections 4 and 5). 
3. Methodology and data 
The methodology developed, in this paper, combines two standard approaches related to 
analysis of bilateral trade relationships. The first one aims to assess intra-OECD trade 
misinvoicing based on partner-country comparison, using mirror data, in order to determine 
gaps between values as recorded by the reporter country and its trading partner. This approach 
was initially proposed by Morgenstern (1950)8 and developed by Bhagwati (1964) to identify 
“anomalies” arising from the declaration of a similar merchandise transaction. The second 
approach provides an adaptation of the geographical trade intensity index proposed by Kojima 
(1964), among others, and extended by Kunimoto (1977) to detect strong relations between 
each country with its trading partners in terms of misinvoicing practices.  
The mirror data technique 
To estimate amounts of trade misinvoicing, exports (imports) of the reporting country are 
compared to imports (exports) of its partner country, after being corrected for the c.i.f./f.o.b. 
bias. The standard ratio9 c.i.f./f.o.b. of 10% is applied here to convert imports into f.o.b. values.  
The bilateral trade balance is used to determine four types of trade misinvoicing. It should be 
noticed that every country in the sample is assumed to be potentially engaged in misinvoicing 
practices. As a result, misreported values are attributed to both partners since computed 
estimations are implemented for all bilateral flows.  
Consequently, the method to compute values of trade misinvoicing can be expressed as follows: 
Export misinvoicing: MisX𝑖𝑗 = M𝑗𝑖 − X𝑖𝑗      (1) 
Import misinvoicing: MisM𝑖𝑗 = M𝑖𝑗 − X𝑗𝑖      (2) 
with Xij and Mij country i’s exports and imports; Mji and Xji country j’s imports and exports (or 
mirror data) respectively. 
The first practice (or first channel) will involve an understatement of values for exports and 
imports, which entails a movement of “hidden” goods during the transaction between country 
i and its partner j.  
                                                          
7 For assessments of trade misinvoicing and IFFs in developing countries, see UNECA (2015), Ndikumana 
(2016) and Salomon and Spanjers (2017); for developed countries, see Hong and Pak (2017). 
8 In this paper, we are referring to Morgenstern O. (1965) On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, 
Princeton University Press; 2nd Revised edition (February 21, 1965). 
9 We computed estimated values of trade misinvoicing with an adjustment ratio of 6%, however, our 
results did not change significantly. 
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The latter is given by: 
Export under-invoicing (MisXu𝑖𝑗) such as M𝑗𝑖 > X𝑖𝑗  
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→    MisX𝑖𝑗 > 0, 
Import under-invoicing: (MisMu𝑖𝑗) such as M𝑖𝑗 < X𝑗𝑖  
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→    MisM𝑖𝑗 < 0. 
Note that export under-invoicing attributed to country i will be translated into an import over-
invoicing for country j as MisXuij = MisMoji. Similarly, import under-invoicing for country i will 
correspond to export over-invoicing for country j as MisMuij = MisXoji. 
The second practice (or second channel) will entail an overstatement of values for exports and 
imports, or movements of “phantom” goods between both countries, as follows: 
Export over-invoicing (MisXo𝑖𝑗) such as M𝑗𝑖 < X𝑖𝑗  
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→    MisX𝑖𝑗 < 0, 
Import over-invoicing: (MisMo𝑖𝑗) such as M𝑖𝑗 > X𝑗𝑖  
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→    MisM𝑖𝑗 > 0. 
As in the first channel, export over-invoicing relative to country i will coincide to an import 
under-invoicing for country j as MisXoij = MisMuji. In the same way, import over-invoicing for 
country i will be an export under-invoicing for country j as MisMoij = MisXuji. 
Now turning to totals of export and import misinvoicing for country i as identified for all its 
trading partners, each category will be expressed in net values given that export over-invoicing 
and import under-invoicing are negative. In this sense, each total is obtained in the following 
manner: 
Sum of export misinvoicing: MisX𝑖 = ∑MisX𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,     (3) 
Sum of import misinvoicing: MisM𝑖 = ∑MisM𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.     (4) 
Finally, in aggregated terms, as regrouping 35 OECD-countries, it should be noticed the following 
results: 
• Sum of export over-invoicing for the OECD = Sum of import under-invoicing for the OECD 
MisXo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = MisMu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷         (5) 
• Sum of export under-invoicing for the OECD = Sum of import over-invoicing for the OECD 
MisXu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = MisMo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷        (6) 
• Sum of export misinvoicing for the OECD = Sum of import misinvoicing for the OECD 
MisX𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = MisM𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 in net values       (7) 
By considering four types of trade misinvoicing (export and import over and under-invoicing), 
we can identify two types of IFFs according to the nature of the flow: physical movements of 
“hidden” merchandises (channel 1) or non-physical movements of “phantom” merchandises 
(channel 2), the latter implying money flows as shown in the Diagram (see Tandon and Rao, 
2017). 
The first channel is driven by physical movements of merchandises that are “hidden” during the 
transaction process. It implies an under-invoicing of exports and imports which allows to move 
in and out illicit flows indirectly, as involving sales and purchases of merchandises.  
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Undervalued exports10 mean receiving lesser amount of money (money outflow) as the trader, 
in the partner country, is supposed to place the remaining funds in a bank account abroad but 
after selling the merchandises. Undervalued imports11 are related to receive larger funds 
(inflows) but involves the selling of the merchandises in the home country. 
Diagram 1: Illicit financial flows according to merchandise movements 
 
Source: Authors. 
By over-invoicing of exports or imports, exporters or importers are reporting amounts (or 
values) of physical and non-physical merchandises. In doing so, this practice would be 
assimilated to “phantom” goods transactions with in counterpart direct money flows. In the case 
of export over-invoicing,12 the exporter is receiving a money inflow larger than he would have 
earn by declaring the true value of exports. As for import over-invoicing,13 the importer will 
receive less money flow (money outflow) according to the real goods transactions. The trader 
localized in the partner country concedes losing benefits on the domestic market but benefits 
from the money flow received. This second channel allows to generate inward and outward illicit 
flows in a relatively direct manner (avoiding in this sense actions of selling or buying any physical 
merchandises). 
As a result, for the country i, IFFs are defined as follows: 
Illicit financial outflows = (MisXu𝑖𝑗 +  MisMo𝑖𝑗),     (8) 
Illicit financial inflows = (MisXo𝑖𝑗 +MisM𝑢𝑖𝑗).      (9) 
Now, considering all OECD countries, there are two ways to characterize IFFs since “nothing is 
lost, everything is transformed”, as follows: 
• from the trade point of view, everything that goes out comes in:  
IFF𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠MisXo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 +MisXu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = MisMo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 + 𝑎𝑏𝑠MisMu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 .  (10) 
• from the accounting point of view, every movement of merchandise is cleared by a 
financial flow: 
IFF𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠MisXo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 +MisMo𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 = MisXu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 + 𝑎𝑏𝑠MisMu𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 .  (11) 
with (abs) denoting absolute values. 
                                                          
10 In this case, it would allow to pay less taxes in exporter’s country or take advantage of black market 
premium.  
11 Undervalued imports are mainly driven by tariff evasion purposes.  
12 According to the literature, this practice may occur when exporters seek to benefit from export 
subsidies or duty drawbacks (such as carousel mechanisms) or to repatriate illicit capitals.  
13 In this case, overvalued imports allow processes of transfer pricing, profit shifting as evading capital 
control. Traditionally, they are related to capital flight purposes. 
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From the trade point of view, IFFS are driven by both channels, and from the accounting point 
of view, they are generated within one channel.  
Bilateral intensity index and trade misinvoicing 
This last step involves an analysis of trade misinvoicing based on bilateral relationships between 
OECD members to appraise tendency for each country to mis-trade with particular partners. 
Computations of bilateral intensity indices provide thus an analytical tool for describing the 
strength of bilateral links between countries in terms of channels used in trade misinvoicing and 
IFFs. 
Following Kunimoto (1977), the bilateral intensity index is considering each country’s total 
import and export misinvoicing as given. The rationale is based on discerning between factors 
that may influence the total levels in misinvoicing in the OECD and those that affect their 
geographical distribution. 
As a result, bilateral intensity indices aim to measure the current trade misinvoicing compared 
to “hypothetical” amounts that would occur under the assumption of no distortion in the 
direction of intra flows of misinvoicing, in geographical terms. In this respect, a country’s total 
share of trade misinvoicing will be allocated among its partners according to their relative shares 
within the OECD. This bilateral intensity trade allows to remove the “size bias”, so each economy 
can be expected to be engaged in misinvoicing practices through exports and imports 
proportionally to its size. 
Since disparities are evidenced between trade data as declared by the reporting country and its 
partner, the bilateral trade intensity index can be calculated using direct data (recorded by the 
reporter) and mirror data (recorded by the trading partner). 
According to direct data as reported by country i, the hypothetical export flow from country i to 
country j is given by: 
X𝑖𝑗
∗ = X𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
M𝑗,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷−M𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
        (12) 
where X𝑖,𝑗
∗  denotes country i’s exports to country j in the hypothetical OECD; X𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 is the 
country i’s total exports to all OECD countries; M𝑗,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 country j’s total imports from the OECD; 
M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 total OECD imports and M𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 the country i’s total imports from OECD.  
This export flow can also be expressed using mirror data as recorded by country i’s trading 
partner in the following manner: 
M𝑗𝑖
∗ = M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖
X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑗
X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷−X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖
         (13) 
where M𝑗𝑖
∗  denotes hypothetical imports as reported by country j from country i; M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖 are 
imports reported by all trading partners from country i, X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑗 total OECD exports to country j, 
X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 total OECD exports and X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖 total exports of OECD countries to country i. 
The expected value of export misinvoicing (MisX𝑖𝑗
∗ ) from country i to country j would be: 
MisX𝑖𝑗
∗ = M𝑗𝑖
∗−X𝑖𝑗
∗           (14) 
The export misinvoicing intensity is thus measured by an index defined as the ratio of the 
estimated (observed) value of export misinvoicing to its hypothetical value: 
𝐼𝑖𝑗
MisX =
MisX𝑖𝑗
MisX𝑖𝑗
∗   with MisX𝑖𝑗 the estimated value.     (15) 
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The similar reasoning applies in order to determine the import misinvoicing intensity as follows:  
M𝑖𝑗
∗ = M𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
X𝑗,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷−X𝑖,𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷
         (16) 
And its mirror equivalent,  
X𝑗𝑖
∗ = X𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖
M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑗
M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷−M𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷,𝑖
         (17) 
As a result, the expected value of import misinvoicing is given by:  
MisM𝑖𝑗
∗ = M𝑖𝑗
∗ −X𝑗𝑖
∗ ,          (18) 
and the corresponding intensity index would be, 
𝐼𝑖,𝑗
MisM =
MisM𝑖𝑗
MisM𝑖𝑗
∗  with MisM𝑖𝑗 the estimated value.     (19) 
Both bilateral intensity indexes will include two types of key information that should be 
highlighted. Absolute values suggest whether bilateral relations are stronger (weaker) than 
expected when greater (less) than 1 on one hand, and the associated sign provides an indication 
of the direction (under- or over-reported values) on the other. Consequently, the computation 
of such bilateral intensity indices can provide a useful tool to identify potential deviations as 
regard trade misinvoicing between each OECD country and its partners.14  
Further observations 
The methodology previously exposed is based on the mirror data technique15 and, in particular, 
includes adjustments made to import values due to the costs incurred in insurance and freight 
(c.i.f), i.e. applying a ratio of 10%. Although the c.i.f. varies across countries and products, when 
estimates of trade misinvoicing are low, it may be argued that discrepancies reflect the gap 
between the proxy and the value of c.i.f. (UNCTAD, 2016). Following the OECD 
recommendations,16 the IMF and the COMTRADE are now using a ratio of 6% as the new 
conversion factor (Marini et al., 2018). As highlighted by Carlo Ferraris17 more than 130 years 
ago, the problem raised by imports valued in c.i.f and exports in f.o.b. has not yet been resolved 
properly by statistical institutions since only few countries report their import data on f.o.b. (e.g. 
Australia, Canada, Mexico and Brazil until recently).  
Following the admonition of Morgenstern (1950), Kenessey (1997) has highlighted the need of 
significant improvements in statistical infrastructure at the international level in order to 
address key issues covering, in particular, accuracy, timeliness and significance of economic 
statistics. As he mentioned, “recognizing the imperfections in users of data is no excuse to 
overlook the deficiencies in the producers of statistics in supplying as accurate data as warranted 
and made possible under the circumstances” (Kenessey, 1997, p.253).  
 
                                                          
14 Trade intensity indices for all country pairs were computed over the period of 2006-2016. 
15 Another issue, intrinsic to the mirror data technique, appears when reporter and partner are 
misreporting the same transaction (over-invoicing in one side and under-invoicing in the other side). In 
this case, the misdeclaration can cancel each other, leading to underestimate the magnitude of overall 
misinvoicing trade (see Nitsch, 2012). 
16 See Miao and Fortanier (2016). For further information on the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio, see Gaulier et al. (2008). 
17 Ferraris, C. (1885): “La Statistica del movimento dei metalli preziosi fra l'Italia e l'estero”, cited by 
Morgenstern (1965, p.139). 
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Data: UN Comtrade database 
Trade statistics for OECD countries are sourced from the UN COMTRADE database18, as being 
assumed to be gathered as reported by individual countries.  
When examining bilateral trade at the country level, two commonly cited datasets include the 
one mentioned previously and that proposed by the IMF in the Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS).19 However, information thus collected may be subject to some limits thereby adding 
caveats in the appraisal of results described hereafter. 
Several issues have been identified in our case, the main ones being related to data coherence. 
A comparison between data compiled by the COMTRADE and the DOTS suggests that statistics 
were not correctly and accurately recorded for some OECD countries, leading to significant 
variations in the results obtained (see Figure 1-A in appendix). For instance, the figure below 
portrays export data from Canada to Hungary, which were retrieved over the selected period, 
showing high disparities between the DOTS, and to a lesser degree the COMTRADE, compared 
to the Canadian International Merchandise Trade Database20.  
Figure 1a. Exports from Canada to Hungary in millions of US$ (2006-2016) 
  
Note: Canadian exports were converted in US dollars according to the exchange rate available at UNCTAD Stat. 
Sources: UN comtrade, IMF DOTS and Statistics Canada. 
Another illustration of inconsistencies is that having concordance between data recorded in 
both databases but not with those registered by national statistical offices as in the case of Chili21 
(see Figure 1b). Even though showing some limitations, the UN COMTRADE database was 
selected for the purpose of this analysis, due to a better consistency with national data (as 
published by reporting countries) and data availability.22  
                                                          
18 Exports are expressed on a f.o.b. basis and imports in c.i.f, except for Australia, Canada, Mexico and 
Slovak Republic (2006-2008). 
19 Our estimation of the magnitude of trade misinvoicing in OECD countries were elaborated initially from 
these two data sets.  
20Source: http://www5.statcan.gc.ca. 
21 In the special case of Chile, one should mention that Chilean imports are also available in f.o.b values 
by trading partner in the National Customs Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Aduanas) but are not 
included in any of these cited databases (see http://www.aduana.cl). 
22 One of the main limitation identified lies in the use of exchange rates that would imply another source 
of bias. As for data consistency concerning OECD countries, the major disparities between national 
statistics and UN data were adjusted. As for data availability, the DOTS database is less complete such as 
in the case of Mexico’s imports and exports that are not available for Estonia, Iceland, Latvia etc., even 
though available in the COMTRADE database and published by the Mexican National Statistical Office 
INEGI (Secretaría de economía).  
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Figure 1b: Exports from Chile to Luxembourg in millions of US$ (2006-2016) 
 
Note: Chilean exports recorded by the Dirección Nacional de Aduanas are available in millions of US dollars.  
Sources: UN comtrade, IMF DOTS and Dirección Nacional de Aduanas. 
In addition, as specified by the OECD in its own database on international merchandise trade, 
data since 2013 about trade in value by partner countries are extracted from the COMTRADE 
database. The International Trade Centre has identified more than thirty reasons for 
discrepancies in bilateral data. Among them, only few apply to the intra-OECD trade. 
Nevertheless, taking into account the motives of misreporting and the limits of the mirror data 
method, the assessment presented below should be considered as a high valuation of the 
misinvoicing within the OECD countries. 
4. Estimates of trade misinvoicing for OECD countries 
OECD countries exert great influence on the dynamics and patterns of global trade: OECD share 
in world exports and imports remains high on average, at around 63% and 66% respectively, 
despite declining trends over the period 2006-2016 (see Figure 2). One of the main features that 
can be emphasized is the significant part of merchandise trade occurring within the OECD, with 
exports reaching the largest percentage (72% of total OECD exports) compared to imports (65% 
of total OECD imports). Intra-OECD trade is, however, characterized by asymmetric patterns 
when taking into account, for instance, the distribution across geographical regions (see Figure 
2-A in appendix).23  
Figure 2: OECD share in world trade and intra-OECD trade, in percentage (2006-2016)  
 
Notes: Units are expressed in current US$ and calculations are realized based on direct data as reported by each 
country and do not consider mirror data. Intra-OECD trade, as % of OECD total trade, is defined as the ratio between 
the sum of export and import values among the OECD members and the sum of values of their total exports and 
imports. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Word Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). 
                                                          
23 In this respect, it is stressed that the EU occupies a dominant position, since 22 of the 28 Member States 
are also members of the OECD. 
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Consequently, OECD tend to be a relevant sample of countries due to their participation in world 
trade when examining the phenomenon of trade misinvoicing. Estimated values of the total 
trade misinvoicing are specified at an aggregated level, covering all bilateral flows across the 35-
member states over the period 2006-2016.  
By referring to the OECD, and thus considering a “closed” set of countries, it is important to 
point out that the total export over-invoicing (or under-invoicing) is equal to the total import 
under-invoicing (or over-invoicing) as mentioned previously. In this case, the discussion below 
will only focus on export discrepancies since it is easily replicable from the import perspective. 
Misdeclared values of exports can result in illicit money inflows (export over-invoicing) and in 
illicit merchandise exit (export under-invoicing).  
The total export misinvoicing generated within the OECD has increased by a factor of 1.8 over 
the 11 past years.24 As depicted in Figure 3, export over-invoicing which entails illicit financial 
inflows constitutes the larger component (on average 75% of the total export misinvoicing), 
amounting to approximately US$ 9,020 billion, accumulated from 2006 to 2016.  
In addition, export under-invoicing accounts, albeit to a lesser extent, for US$ 276 billion on 
average each year and its share in total misinvoicing has risen by 0.25% during the period and 
registered an accelerating rate of 6.85% over the last three years, in contrast with the downward 
trend of the share of export over-invoicing.25  
Figure 3: Trends of OECD’s export misinvoicing in billions of US$ (2006-2016)  
 
Notes: Units are expressed in current US$. MISXo and MISXu stand for export over-invoicing and export under-
invoicing, respectively. The bars in the figure represent cumulated sums during the studied period (second vertical 
axis). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE database. 
In such context, these figures provide more insight into the size of trade misinvoicing, especially 
for countries mostly regarded as developed/advanced economies,26 forging trade relationships 
essentially with developed/advanced countries. To give an order of magnitude, a simple 
calculation exercise, based on data provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) gathering 29 OECD countries, suggest that the total development aid granted in 2016 by 
                                                          
24 Export misinvoicing is calculated using absolute values of export over-invoicing due to negative figures. 
25 According to our calculations, estimates show an overall 0.1% decrease over the period, at an even 
faster diminishing rate of 2.16% between 2014 and 2016. 
26 According to either the UN classification or the IMF World Economic Outlook. 
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12,053 9,020
1,096 3,033
5,987
Total trade misinvoicing-accumulated
Total trade misinvoicing per year (on average)
Total Export over invoicing (Import under-invoicing)-accumulated
Total Export under-invoicing (Import over-invoicing)- accumulated
Total Export (import) misinvoicing in net values-accumulated
Trade misinvoicing for OECD (in Trillions US$): 
the DAC members barely reaches 20% of the amount generated by the sole export over-
invoicing in the same year (see Table 2-A in appendix). 
When turning to each country’s participation, the estimated grand total of trade misinvoicing is 
split into four categories, i.e. over-and under-reporting of exports and imports. Table 1 displays 
the ranking of the OECD countries according to their average shares in the total amount of each 
category, expressed in percentage, and according to which channel is used to misreport trade 
values. As expected, the major OECD economies appear in the top ranking which tend to reflect 
their global trade performance and/or the importance of market size as measured by population 
or relative wealth.  
Table 1: Countries’ participation in total OECD misinvoicing by category in percentage (2006-2016) 
 
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by descending order. Total of channel (1) comprises export and import under-invoicing 
and total of channel (2) combines export and import over-invoicing.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
Focusing on the first channel, United States and Netherlands are among the highest ranked of 
the OECD-35 by under-invoicing both their exports and imports. France, Germany and United 
Kingdom tend to rely more on an undervaluation of their imports (“hidden” goods to enter) in 
contrast with Japan, Ireland and Mexico more prone to undervalue their exports (“hidden” 
goods to exit). As for the second channel, involving money flows as a counterpart of “phantom” 
goods, Germany, Belgium and Mexico are more likely to overstate in both directions, while 
Netherlands and Italy seem to facilitate overinvoicing practices from the export side, compared 
to Canada and Japan from the import side. 
As a result, by considering the completeness of each channel, countries’ positioning changes 
slightly indicating which channel is favoured, on average, when misdeclaring merchandise values 
(columns 5 & 6, Table 1).  
Export Under-
Invoicing (exit) (%)
Import Under-
Invoicing (entry) (%)
Export Over-Invoicing 
(inflows) (%) 
Import Over-Invoicing 
(outflows) (%)
Total
(%)
Total
(%)
1 United States 23.3 France 14.7 Germany 19.5 Germany 16.3 United States 15.8 Germany 18.7
2 Japan 12.0 Germany 14.4 Belgium 14.1 Mexico 12.0 France 12.3 Belgium 12.8
3 Ireland 7.7 United States 13.3 Netherlands 9.9 Canada 11.4 Germany 11.3 Netherlands 7.5
4 Mexico 6.8 Netherlands 8.3 United Kingdom 7.1 Belgium 8.9 Netherlands 7.8 United Kingdom 6.5
5 Netherlands 6.4 United Kingdom 6.2 Italy 5.0 Japan 6.7 United Kingdom 5.2 Mexico 6.3
6 France 5.1 Spain 5.0 Mexico 4.3 United States 6.4 Spain 3.9 Canada 5.0
7 Korea 4.7 Poland 4.7 France 4.1 France 6.1 Poland 3.6 France 4.6
8 Canada 4.1 Italy 3.9 Czech Republic 3.0 United Kingdom 4.9 Japan 3.6 Italy 4.0
9 Norway 4.0 Switzerland 3.7 Canada 2.9 Australia 2.8 Italy 3.5 United States 3.7
10 Switzerland 2.7 Austria 3.1 Norway 2.8 Spain 2.2 Switzerland 3.5 Japan 3.4
11 Italy 2.4 Czech Republic 2.5 United States 2.8 Sweden 2.1 Ireland 3.2 Czech Republic 2.7
12 Turkey 2.2 Turkey 1.8 Spain 2.8 Austria 1.8 Austria 2.5 Spain 2.6
13 United Kingdom 2.2 Slovak Republic 1.8 Switzerland 2.8 Czech Republic 1.7 Norway 2.2 Norway 2.4
14 Australia 2.2 Ireland 1.7 Poland 2.7 Israel 1.6 Canada 2.0 Switzerland 2.3
15 Germany 2.1 Norway 1.6 Japan 2.3 Korea 1.5 Czech Republic 2.0 Poland 2.3
16 Luxembourg 1.3 Finland 1.4 Austria 2.0 Turkey 1.5 Turkey 1.9 Austria 2.0
17 Israel 1.2 Canada 1.3 Sweden 1.9 Poland 1.3 Korea, Rep. 1.9 Sweden 2.0
18 Finland 1.2 Sweden 1.2 Hungary 1.7 Norway 1.3 Mexico 1.8 Hungary 1.5
19 Denmark 1.0 Belgium 1.1 Slovak Republic 1.6 Ireland 1.2 Slovak Republic 1.4 Slovak Republic 1.4
20 Chile 1.0 Denmark 1.0 Korea 1.2 Switzerland 1.1 Finland 1.4 Korea, Rep. 1.3
21 Sweden 0.9 Korea 0.9 Denmark 1.1 Italy 1.1 Sweden 1.2 Australia 1.2
22 Spain 0.9 Japan 0.8 Portugal 0.8 Slovak Republic 0.9 Denmark 1.0 Denmark 0.9
23 Austria 0.6 Luxembourg 0.7 Australia 0.6 Hungary 0.9 Belgium 0.9 Portugal 0.7
24 Hungary 0.6 Greece 0.7 Israel 0.4 Netherlands 0.7 Luxembourg 0.9 Israel 0.7
25 Portugal 0.6 Hungary 0.7 Turkey 0.4 New Zealand 0.5 Australia 0.8 Turkey 0.7
26 Czech Republic 0.5 Portugal 0.6 Chile 0.4 Chile 0.5 Israel 0.7 Ireland 0.5
27 New Zealand 0.5 Slovenia 0.6 Slovenia 0.3 Denmark 0.5 Hungary 0.7 Chile 0.4
28 Latvia 0.4 Israel 0.5 Finland 0.3 Finland 0.5 Portugal 0.6 Finland 0.4
29 Poland 0.3 Estonia 0.3 Greece 0.3 Portugal 0.4 Greece 0.5 Slovenia 0.3
30 Slovak Republic 0.2 Chile 0.3 Estonia 0.2 Greece 0.4 Chile 0.5 Greece 0.3
31 Estonia 0.2 New Zealand 0.3 Ireland 0.2 Slovenia 0.3 Slovenia 0.5 Estonia 0.2
32 Belgium 0.2 Australia 0.3 Latvia 0.2 Estonia 0.2 New Zealand 0.3 New Zealand 0.1
33 Slovenia 0.2 Latvia 0.2 Iceland 0.1 Iceland 0.2 Estonia 0.3 Latvia 0.1
34 Iceland 0.1 Iceland 0.1 Luxembourg 0.1 Luxembourg 0.1 Latvia 0.3 Iceland 0.1
35 Greece 0.1 Mexico 0.1 New Zealand 0.0 Latvia 0.0 Iceland 0.1 Luxembourg 0.1
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
#
Channel (1): "hidden" goods transactions Channel (2)Channel (1)Channel (2):  "phantom" goods transactions (money flows)
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For instance, related to “hidden” goods movements, Japan, Ireland and Mexico move down to 
the 8th, 11th and 18th position respectively as using a “mix” between both channels. On the 
other hand, by focusing only on the second channel, Canada, Italy and Japan also declined few 
places in the overall classification. Nonetheless, both rankings remain fairly constant for 
Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States classified among 
the top 5 according to each criterion.  
Finally, it is worth noting the significant position of Japan and Mexico by under-reporting their 
exports and over-invoicing their imports as well as that of Italy showing a high ratio relative to 
export over-invoicing given their moderate contribution to the overall trade within the OECD.27 
Likewise, the particular case of Ireland deserves to be mentioned by occupying a high position 
related to export under-invoicing notwithstanding its size and performance accounting for only 
1.6% of OECD total exports.  
That being said, it is important to bear in mind that the previous ranking is only intended to 
provide a relative positioning among OECD countries with reference to trade data discrepancies 
but measured in absolute terms. To offer a different perspective, a first step consists in assessing 
each misinvoicing category relative to direct trade data in values as declared by each country. 
Following Morgenstern (1965, p. 169), these percentage differences highlight four distinct cases 
as illustrated in the figure below.  
Figure 4: Ratio of trade misinvoicing estimates to official trade values by country (imports and exports), in percentage 
(2006-2016)  
 
Notes: Each ratio is calculated as total exports (imports) misinvoicing from the reporter’s perspective arising from its 
bilateral transactions divided by total exports (imports) according to reporter’s statistics and averaged over the 
period. Country codes are included in Table 1-A (in appendix). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
The first case – at the upper left quadrant – indicates the complete channel (1) related to 
movements of “hidden” goods: countries tend to undervalue their exported and imported goods 
(or their trading partners tend to overstate their trade statistics in both directions as using the 
second channel). In this instance, two countries previously mentioned – Ireland and the United 
States – seem to establish their position although with slight variations: Ireland also appears to 
                                                          
27 For further details, see Table 1-A in appendix. 
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adopt an under-invoicing practice as for its imports expressed in proportion of the direct 
declared value.  
Furthermore, particular high ratios shown by Luxembourg draw attention as an example of 
“extreme” under-invoicing relatively to others countries, taking into account its limited 
participation in intra-OECD trade over the period (see Table 1-A in appendix). 
The second – at the lower right quadrant – is the symmetric case of the first one but in terms of 
money flows, which involves an over-reporting of both imports and exports from the perspective 
of the country (or an under-reporting in both directions for its trading partners). Comments 
stated above still apply for Canada, Mexico and Belgium, the latter well ahead given its position 
in terms of export over-invoicing when referring to direct data. 
The third case – at the upper right quadrant – suggests misinvoicing practices related to both 
channels, an export under-invoicing and import over-invoicing, which both point in the same 
direction in terms of illicit financial outflows, Japan clearly confirming its ranking as noted 
previously. 
The last case – at the lower left quadrant – displays the larger concentration of OECD members, 
22 countries out of 35, which underlies the most distinctive feature previously identified about 
illicit financial inflows. France and Netherlands remain among the first places relative to import 
misinvoicing and Germany’s position is quite similar to that of the United Kingdom. Of particular 
interest are the cases of Poland and Slovakia for which trade misreporting represents a 
substantial part of their official merchandise values, as showing high ratios in this respect. In 
addition, these two economies currently exhibit relatively low GDP per capita, as will be 
examined infra, and should be characterized by a tendency towards illicit financial outflows 
according to the dominant related-literature. 
As a second step, it is also relevant to nuance such positioning in conjunction with a cross-
country comparison regarding each component of trade misinvoicing and the use of each 
channel depending on GDP per capita (as a proxy of development level). Figures 5a and 5b 
indicate that trade misreporting globally shows high ratios associated to direct import data, 
regardless a priori of GDP per capita levels. However, this phenomenon seems to be more 
widespread among countries with lower GDP per capita, especially concerning import under-
invoicing. 
On the issue of illicit financial inflows, using both channels, movements of “hidden” goods tend 
to be the dominant pattern among OECD countries. Some particular cases can be briefly 
outlined: (i) higher ratios of import under-invoicing are essentially associated with the most 
advanced economies within the OECD. For example, Ireland and Luxembourg generates about 
88% of their illicit financial inflows through this practice, along with Finland and United States at 
around 82%;28 (ii) Among countries with lower GDP per capita, import discrepancies derived 
from their statistical data are rather high, such as the cases of Slovakia accounting for 36% of 
the reported value and Poland for 34%; (iii) Conversely, Belgium and Mexico, although 
characterized by different GDP per capita, rely primarily on export over-invoicing and use this 
channel at 93% and 98% respectively to repatriate illicit financial flows; and (iv) as pointed out 
before, Germany and Netherlands are among the countries which are using both categories in a 
balanced fashion in that respect. 
                                                          
28 These percentages can be easily calculated from Table 1-A in appendix.  
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When it comes to illicit financial outflows, even though imports still remain as the major vehicle 
through over-invoicing practice, the scale and distribution of trade misinvoicing across countries 
is less pronounced, particularly in the case of economies with high GDP per capita. However, it 
should be noticed that: (i) within the group of upper-middle GDP per capita, Belgium and 
Germany appear to drive essentially their illicit financial outflows through the second channel, 
and thus import over-invoicing, at around 98% and 92%; (ii) as mentioned before, the most 
developed countries depend more on average upon export under-invoicing, except for Sweden 
using import over-invoicing at 72% to move abroad illicit financial flows; and (iii) among 
countries with higher rates of export under-invoicing, Luxembourg and Latvia are more prone 
to use this channel regarding their illicit financial outflows, showing a ratio at approximately 
93%. 
Figure 5a: Ratios of illicit inflows (both channels) to trade values as reported by each country, in percentage (2006-
2016) 
 
Figure 5b: Ratios of illicit outflows (both channels) to trade values reported by each country, in percentage (2006-
2016) 
 
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by GDP per capita. The latter is expressed in current dollars and its classification is relative 
to the OECD grouping. Average GDP per capita observations are sorted according to computed interquartile ranges 
in the following manner: High (50,571 GDP p.c.); Upper-middle (40,157  GDP p.c. < 50,571; Lower-middle (20,435 
 GDP p.c. <40,157; Lower (20,435 <GDP p.c.).  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD STAT and UN COMTRADE databases. 
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The final step will consist in examining the overall growth dynamics of each component to 
identify diminishing and increasing patterns among OECD countries. The data contained in Table 
2 tend to underscore different dynamics between individual countries and misinvoicing 
categories according to growth rates relative to reported statistics on exports and imports.  
It should be noticed that none of the OECD countries has registered a diminishing growth rate 
in the four categories related to trade misreporting. In addition, when official trade values tend 
to decline (or increase), around 54% of the OECD countries display growth rates evolving in the 
same direction for export misinvoicing and 46 % for import misinvoicing, mostly concentrated 
in the latter group of low GDPs per capita. This positive relation is observed simultaneously for 
exports and imports only for the cases of Korea, Japan and New Zealand.  
On average, the category of export under-invoicing displays higher growth rates, thus indicating 
an increasing use of the first channel (“hidden” goods movements) driven by the steep rise of 
eight economies among them Israel, Poland and Belgium. As for the understated imports, 
among the first ranked countries are Australia and Chile. Conversely, we can discern the case of 
Greece registering a declining trend relative to both components while Belgium and United 
Kingdom show negative growth rates in import and export under-invoicing respectively. 
Regarding the second channel, through overdeclared values of imports and exports, New 
Zealand is well ahead related to the export side and five countries, such as Switzerland, Ireland 
and Luxembourg, demonstrate high growth rates viewed from the import side. The most 
diminishing trends related to this channel are presented by Finland and Chile (export over-
invoicing) and by United Kingdom and Portugal (import over-invoicing). 
At this stage of the analysis, four broad regularities can be outlined for the OECD countries over 
the period 2006-2016:  
▪ As a whole, OECD countries tend to be characterized by gaps in trade statistics pointing 
towards predominant illicit financial inflows depending on channels used (movements 
of “hidden” or “phantom” goods). However, above described estimates indicate that 
illicit financial outflows may be increasing at a steady pace, especially within the last 
three years; 
▪ The decomposition of trade misinvoicing into four categories enables to identify the 
main scenario emerging from data discrepancies among OECD countries, which is 
related to practices concerning export over-invoicing and import under-invoicing. Both 
practices rely on a different channel to repatriate illicit financial flows from abroad. The 
distribution of the countries suggests that the underreporting of imports is more 
widespread as expressed relative to import values declared by each country. This last 
finding tends to favour the first channel (or movements of “hidden” goods) as regards 
illicit financial inflows;  
▪ In addition, misdeclared values of imports seem to appear as the main conduit to move 
illicit financial flows across borders regardless of GDP per capita levels, even though this 
pattern is less marked in the case of illicit outflows; 
▪ Conversely, in terms of growth dynamics, a positive relationship is likely to appear 
between trends in exports and imports (according to official data) and growth of trade 
discrepancies, particularly for the group of low GDPs per capita, demonstrating in this 
case some evidence of the impact of development levels.  
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Table 2: Growth rates in percentage respective to official trade values and trade misinvoicing for OECD countries 
(2006-2016) 
 
Notes: Countries are ranked by GDP per capita. The latter is expressed in current dollars and its classification is relative 
to the OECD grouping. Average GDP per capita observations are sorted according to computed interquartile ranges 
in the following manner: High (50,571 GDP p.c.); Upper-middle (40,157  GDP p.c. < 50,571; Lower-middle (20,435 
 GDP p.c. <40,157; Lower (20,435 <GDP p.c.). Growth rates are computed over the studied period based on the 
Least-Squares method. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD STAT and UN COMTRADE databases. 
5- Analysis of bilateral trade misinvoicing: selected country cases  
This section offers a more in-depth analysis at a country level, based on particular cases that 
have demonstrated relevant features and significance to illustrate some behaviours related to 
trade misinvoicing phenomenon within the OECD. In such context, Germany, Japan, Mexico and 
the United States were selected according to their participation and to achieve representation 
from all the four cases highlighted in Figure 4, in terms of IFFs and of the channel used to move 
“hidden” or “phantom” merchandises (see Figure 3-A in appendix). In this respect, bilateral 
intensity indices adapted to include trade misreporting are being computed for all country pairs 
over the period of 2006-2016.29  
                                                          
29 The bilateral intensity index related to export and import misinvoicing was computed for all 35 OECD 
countries, each one with their 34 trading partners over 11 years. Nevertheless, results are too numerous 
to be all mentioned here. Only those showing the strongest and weakest relationships were reported for 
the selected countries under study. 
Reporting Export growth Import growth
country  (%) Over-invoicing Under-invoicing  (%) Under-invoicing Over-invoicing
Luxembourg -1.99 -1.79 -3.60 -0.63 0.21 15.38
Norway -2.65 -5.71 -5.61 0.26 4.70 4.19
Switzerland 4.94 8.46 -5.20 5.39 -1.84 30.53
Denmark -0.57 3.63 5.08 -0.62 0.70 -6.67
Australia 0.27 -2.31 0.63 1.94 12.27 -3.41
Ireland 0.56 -2.51 -4.18 -0.45 -2.73 16.95
Sweden -1.20 -0.65 3.72 0.16 -0.89 6.65
Iceland 1.06 0.27 9.45 -1.85 1.71 -6.28
United States 2.65 -0.88 -1.60 2.42 0.81 13.22
Netherlands 0.60 -1.53 6.06 0.75 0.29 11.04
Austria 0.37 -1.99 16.50 0.58 -0.80 -6.48
Finland -2.85 -8.84 -1.17 -1.90 -1.85 9.81
Canada 0.37 -2.24 -0.55 1.93 4.59 2.22
Belgium -0.01 -0.16 18.52 -0.17 -4.30 2.13
Germany 0.86 1.91 -0.12 0.69 1.37 -4.05
United Kingdom -0.63 -1.65 -7.93 0.23 2.77 -12.82
France -0.51 2.80 7.36 -0.22 -0.39 1.32
Japan -1.55 -4.31 -1.74 1.26 0.98 1.88
New Zealand 1.52 35.04 0.97 2.23 2.05 6.49
Italy -0.08 -1.03 12.75 -1.37 -2.08 0.15
Israel 0.94 11.72 23.21 3.21 -3.04 9.77
Spain 1.92 8.24 -7.50 -2.28 -3.88 -2.58
Korea, Rep. 2.99 9.24 -0.13 2.79 4.77 7.40
Greece 2.21 8.64 -9.74 -6.81 -7.80 -7.84
Slovenia 2.49 0.19 19.43 0.33 1.73 -4.20
Portugal 1.72 1.54 -2.01 -1.95 -2.72 -9.65
Czech Rep. 4.59 5.23 16.17 2.73 5.23 4.77
Estonia 4.82 4.86 3.03 2.24 0.03 -3.97
Slovakia 5.20 7.63 21.21 2.88 9.59 6.03
Latvia 6.04 9.57 -8.61 1.57 5.79 -6.87
Hungary 2.35 3.86 7.77 1.60 5.13 7.88
Chile -2.01 -7.81 -4.08 4.95 11.63 4.10
Poland 5.47 2.37 23.03 2.11 7.47 1.90
Turkey 3.64 -2.79 4.70 3.52 6.63 -5.25
Mexico 5.01 3.62 6.46 3.91 0.92 -4.46
High GDP per capita 
Upper- middle GDP per capita
Lower-middle GDP per capita
Low GDP per capita 
Export misinvoicing growth (%) Import misinvoicing growth (%)
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From the previous analysis, this index is used to explore whether these countries have showed 
a bias towards intense practices of misinvoicing with certain trading partners. In addition, similar 
indexes will be reported but relative to the trading partners’ side to provide a complete picture 
of the bilateral relation.30 
The case of Japan: Illicit financial outflows based on the complementary between the two 
channels of misreported values 
As pointed before, Japan is essentially characterized by using both channels to misreport its 
trade data, through export under-invoicing and import over-invoicing, in order to move abroad 
illicit flows. However, this pattern seems to change over the period when taking into account 
the dynamic dimension of each component of trade misinvoicing. Indeed, it can be observed 
that misstated export values tend to follow a decreasing trend, with export over-invoicing 
registering the largest decline (at around 3%) against a steady growth as for misreported 
imports.  
When focusing on Japan’s main partners relative to trade misinvoicing, it is interesting to note 
several patterns induced by bilateral relations: For instance, Japan’s bilateral relation with 
Belgium tends to be based on the first channel, or “hidden” goods transactions, to generate 
reciprocal financial flows (outflows and inflows); with Korea and Netherlands, both channels are 
used to repatriate illicit flows from abroad; and for the case of the United States, generated illicit 
inflows and outflows are driven by the same channel, i.e. “phantom” goods movements. 
Moreover, it is important to add that, from the import side, misreported values tend to be 
relatively more concentrated between Japan’s trading partners with a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index31 of about 0.15 declining however at a rate of 5.8% over the period. As a result, this process 
towards more diversified partners is suggesting a potential pattern shift in favour of the practice 
of import over-invoicing, the latter being supported by observed trends in Figure 3-A (in 
appendix). 
With this in mind, when turning to geographical intensity indexes related to trade misreporting, 
Japan shows strong relations, from the export side, with New Zealand, Korea, Chile and the 
United States. From the import side, intense relationships can be identified with Australia, 
Mexico, France and Korea (see Table 3-A in appendix). Japan’s bilateral relation with Germany 
denotes a particular case, being highly intense from the export side and among the weakest 
from the import side. Generally, the overall pattern observed for Japan tends to indicate that 
illicit inflows are associated with its neighbouring partners, bilateral relations being more 
intense in this direction, compared to illicit outflows, which are more distant32 – and also less 
intense – with some exceptions as emphasized infra. Figure 6 thus displays the most salient 
features relative to bilateral intensities ascribed to Japan, illustrated by the cases of the United 
States and Germany.  
From the export side, Japan has developed intense relations with the United States and 
Germany, even though the latter is ranked further down among its partners in terms of 
misinvoicing categories. For both trading partners, the relation is less intensive when examining 
                                                          
30 According to Kunimoto (1977, p.17), the index of geographic export intensity of country i should be 
completed by the presentation of the import intensity index of country j (its trade partner). 
31 Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHI) and their respective growth rates were calculated for all OECD 
countries according to the two broad categories of misinvoicing.  
32 In this case, illicit financial outflows seem to be directed particularly towards European countries. 
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their intensity indexes from the import misinvoicing side. In the case of the United States, the 
bilateral relation is primarily described by illicit financial inflows relying on different channels. 
Figure 6: Japan’s bilateral intensity index (export and import misinvoicing) by selected partners (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MISXu and MISXo denote export under-invoicing and over-invoicing respectively, and MISMu and MISMo 
stand for import under-invoicing and over-invoicing. (*) stands for the hypothetical misinvoicing. Import or export 
intensity refer to import misinvoicing and export misinvoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
However, the expected relation from Japan to the United States would be subject to export 
underinvoicing as its overall pattern seems to indicate. As for Germany, we found the opposite 
pattern since Japan tends to understate its export values towards the German market as 
“predicted” but Germany would be expected to underreport imports using the first channel, 
contrary to the situation that actually applies, resulting in observed illicit financial outflows. In 
the case of Korea, not presented here, all indexes tend to confirm the hypothetical scenario 
towards illicit inflows by means of the second channel, through movements of “phantom” goods 
for Japan (export over-invoicing) and of “hidden goods” for Korea (import under-invoicing).  
When analysing the import side, intense relations are also indicated for both partners, Korea 
and Mexico. Japan’s relation with Korea is mostly characterized by import under-invoicing as 
expected. This bilateral relation is based on the use of both channels to facilitate illicit inflows. 
Of interest is the case of Mexico implying illicit outflows using the first channel regarding Japan. 
However, the expected relation would be towards illicit inflows from Mexico to Japan, or 
“phantom” goods transactions, but instead the estimated values suggest understated exports. 
As a result, the observed situation between Japan and Mexico is contrary to the hypothetical 
scenario, showing illicit financial outflows by means of both channels.  
The case of Mexico: Illicit financial outflows and inflows based on one channel of misreported 
values 
Alike the previous case, the situation of Mexico demonstrates opposite patterns according to 
the main literature on trade misinvoicing: Japan is among the more advanced economies and 
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still shows evidence of illicit financial outflows; Mexico is among the lowest GDPs per capita 
relative to the OECD average and yet tends to be characterized by illicit inflows.  
Mexico’s position relative to its official trade amounts indicates a particular case of over-
invoicing in both directions. When considering its main trading partners, the latter comment is 
exemplified by its bilateral relation with the United States although misinvoicing practices vary 
depending on OECD countries. In the cases of Canada and Japan, for example, import over-
invoicing prevails associated to export under-invoicing, involving two different kinds of illicit 
financial flows and also of channels used. In addition, overvalued exports and undervalued 
imports seem to be concentrated within few trading partners. Trends relative to each 
component of trade misinvoicing indicate that the first channel, through understated exports, 
follows a gradually rising trend but also underline a change relative to the second channel in 
terms of illicit inflows and outflows.  
The figure below highlights some specific bilateral relations between Mexico and its premier 
partners, regardless of goods flows, which are the United States and Canada. From the export 
side, Turkey tends to be well positioned as Korea and Japan from the import side (see Table 4-A 
in appendix). Mexico’s bilateral intensity index related to export misinvoicing exhibits distinct 
features depending on the trading partner considered. In the case of Canada, the key 
characteristic identified relates to illicit outflows driven by both channels, even though the 
hypothetical situation suggests that Mexico would be more prone to overstate its exports. It 
should be noticed that the bilateral intensity index exhibits high values in the case of Canada. 
Conversely, for the United States, the hypothetical scenario seems to be confirmed pointing to 
illicit financial inflows. As for the import side, a changing pattern can be outlined: until 2011, 
Mexico’s bilateral intensity with the United States was as expected, in terms of import over-
invoicing, but has evolving towards import under-invoicing. As for the United States, over the 
entire period, the observed values relative to export under-invoicing were contrary to the 
supposed situation. 
Figure 7: Mexico’s bilateral intensity index (export and import misinvoicing) by selected partners (2006-2016) 
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Notes: MISXu and MISXo denote export under-invoicing and over-invoicing respectively, and MISMu and MISMo 
stand for import under-invoicing and over-invoicing. (*) stands for the hypothetical misinvoicing. Import or export 
intensity refer to import misinvoicing and export misinvoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
The case of the United States: Illicit inflows and outflows based on the first channel 
For the United States, it should be noticed that IFFs are predominantly based on the use of the 
“hidden” goods technique: illicit inflows are chiefly facilitated by undervalued imports, reaching 
an accumulated amount of 1.2 trillion US$, and illicit outflows rely on undervalued exports,33 
accounting for 0.7 trillion US$, over the period. In the latter case, import over-invoicing tends to 
increase strongly compared to others components of trade misinvoicing, at a rate of about 13% 
against declining rates for related-export misreporting. As displayed in Figure 3-A (in appendix), 
all four categories of trade misinvoicing were impacted by the 2008 financial crisis, as depending 
on trade volumes, but showed a quick recovery in 2009. The first channel is clearly predominant 
whereas the second channel indicates two switching-points in 2012 and 2014 as regards illicit 
outflows and inflows.  
IFFs’ patterns indicate, on the other hand, that the United States has developed an inflow-inflow 
situation with Germany and Mexico by means of the first channel and has used both channels 
regarding its relations with Canada based on an inflow-inflow structure and with France pointing 
to an outflow-outflow structure. From this perspective, United States’ practice destined to 
understate trade values is highly diversified among its trading partners as opposed to the over-
invoicing practice more concentrated.  
Focusing on United States’ bilateral intensity, stronger relations have been established with 
Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Japan from the export side, and with Mexico, the 
United Kingdom, Estonia, Germany and Canada on the import side (see Table 5-A in appendix). 
Viewing in first instance bilateral intensity indexes related to export misreporting, it is important 
to underline that the United Kingdom and Japan are among the first ranked countries in the 
United States’ bilateral misinvoicing according to the first channel. However, over the entire 
period, neither the United Kingdom nor Japan appear as partner country as regards the second 
channel relative to overstated values of exports or imports.  
In Figure 8, bilateral intensity indices related to export misinvoicing suggest more intense 
relations for the United States than for its partners, Japan and the United Kingdom. In the first 
case, observed values exhibit an under-reporting practice towards illicit outflows contrary to the 
expected scenario alike Japan showing over-stated values of imports instead of hypothetical 
under-valued imports. As a result, the bilateral relation established between these two countries 
is clearly contrary to the predicted situation. Rather than reaching an inflow-inflow structure 
through both channels, good transactions is leading to an outflow-outflow pattern. 
In the case of export misinvoicing with the United Kingdom, illicit outflows relying on the first 
channel tend to corroborate the hypothetical scenario for the United States while, for the United 
Kingdom, the observed pattern is differing from the expected one. Bilateral relations are thus 
characterized by an outflow-outflow situation between these two countries. 
In a second step, as for the United Kingdom, misinvoicing intensity relative to import values tend 
to support “on average” the expected situation, showing an outflow-inflow pattern. At last but 
not least, the bilateral trade misinvoicing with Mexico shows very strong intensity values. Here, 
                                                          
33 In fact, total illicit outflows are reaching sizeable amounts over the period when including the second 
channel (0.9 trillion U$). 
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both observed values, arising from import under-invoicing by the United States and export over-
invoicing by Mexico, are conform with the predicted direction. The overall situation tends to 
underline an inflow-inflow pattern driven by the complementarity of both channels. 
Figure 8: The United States’ bilateral intensity index (export and import misinvoicing) by selected partners (2006-
2016) 
 
Notes: MISXu and MISXo denote export under-invoicing and over-invoicing respectively, and MISMu and MISMo 
stand for import under-invoicing and over-invoicing. (*) stands for the hypothetical misinvoicing. Import or export 
intensity refer to import misinvoicing and export misinvoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
The case of Germany: Illicit financial inflows based on both channels of misreported values 
The case of Germany is situated in the most widespread configuration applying to the OECD 
countries, as using both channels to misreport trade values in direction of illicit inflows. Although 
this case tends to be described in terms of illicit financial inflows, it has to be acknowledged that 
consistent values derived from data discrepancies with Germany’s partners are also resulting in 
illicit outflows by means of import over-invoicing. 
This predominant use of “phantom goods” method is pointing to large amounts of export over-
invoicing – exceeding 1.7 trillion US$ accumulated over the studied period, with a peak in 2014 
of 182 billion US$ – compared to amounts of import over-invoicing when added up are reaching 
around 0.5 trillion in the same period. In addition, it should be noticed that illicit inflows are 
likely to be distributed among a large number of countries while illicit outflows tend to be highly 
concentrated, as export under-invoicing being restricted for instance to a relatively small 
number of 13 countries (Canada, Mexico, Belgium, New Zealand and Japan at the top five). 
Within Germany’s main partners, bilateral relations are especially developed through the first 
channel with Belgium, leading to an outflow-inflow situation, while with Netherlands and France 
both channels seem to operate in generating illicit inflows, as detailed hereafter. 
Regarding bilateral trade intensity, Germany presents strong relations in export misinvoicing 
with France, Poland and Luxembourg, and concerning import misinvoicing with Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Austria, Canada and Mexico being ranked among the weakest relations 
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independently from the kind of misreporting practice (see Table 6-A in appendix). As mentioned 
for Japan, illicit inflows have involved geographically close partners to Germany, while illicit 
outflows are linked to more distant countries.  
In Figure 9, it can be observed that the intense relation established with Luxembourg relies 
primary on export over-invoicing, although the latter is ranked 17th out of OECD-35 according 
to estimated values in such category. In addition, under the hypothetical scenario, Germany 
would be expected to under-register its exports whereas Luxembourg’s bilateral intensity, less 
pronounced, tends to confirm the expected practice by undervaluing its imports.  
Figure 9: Germany’s bilateral intensity index (export and import misinvoicing) by selected partners (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MISXu and MISXo denote export under-invoicing and over-invoicing respectively, and MISMu and MISMo 
stand for import under-invoicing and over-invoicing. (*) stands for the hypothetical misinvoicing. Import or export 
intensity refer to import misinvoicing and export misinvoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the UN COMTRADE database. 
Contrary to the predicted bilateral relation between these two countries suggesting an outflow-
inflow situation through the first channel, the observed pattern depicts goods transactions 
resulting in illicit inflows based on both channels. As for the case of France, it is clearly apparent 
that observed and hypothetical situations are fully aligned since 2009, according to illicit inflows 
driven by complementary channels. It is noteworthy to mention that this bilateral relation is 
more intense for Germany given France’s positioning in the ranking of export over-invoicing and 
import under-invoicing (at the first and third place respectively). To emphasize this pattern, it 
should be noticed that no export under-invoicing was recorded with France during the studied 
period.  
When analysing the import misinvoicing side, Germany shows particular high values in its 
bilateral intensity indexes with Hungary. In this context, it can be stressed a switching pattern in 
Germany’s practice of misinvoicing: it was only as from 2013 that expected relation was 
established in direction of illicit outflows towards Hungary using the second channel, instead of 
observed illicit inflows before that year. Over the same period, Hungary’s bilateral intensity 
derived from misreported exports was consistent with the hypothetical scenario, through export 
over-invoicing. The bilateral relation between these two countries thus reflects a case of 
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outflow-inflow structure based on the first channel. On the other hand, Germany’s bilateral 
relation with Austria tends to be easier to interpret since 2008, as both situations, observed and 
expected, seem to coincide according to values of respective intensity indexes.  
As a result, this misinvoicing relation is essentially described in terms of illicit inflows using 
complementary channels. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The extensive use of the mirror data technique has prompted debate on possible reasons for 
explaining mismatches between trade flows reported by one country and the same flows 
reported by its trading partner. Major explanations advanced range from transportation costs 
to structural and logistical issues relative to distinct statistical registration systems across 
countries. However, global efforts to deter illicit financial flows have put forward a growing 
interest in such technique to appraise the magnitude of trade misinvoicing identified as a 
significant channel used inter alia to evade tariffs and taxes, to transfer illegitimate capitals 
across borders, and to facilitate money laundering. As a result, discrepancies in bilateral trade 
data can reveal deliberate misreporting by under-invoicing or over-invoicing exports and 
imports. 
However, it must be acknowledged that the burgeoning literature addressing this issue has 
mainly focused its attention on attributing misinvoicing practices to developing countries 
through analysis on illicit financial outflows to developed countries, which can lead to recognize 
only one facet of the reality thereby failing to give the whole picture, as highlighted by some 
recent studies (Rao and Tandon, 2017; Hong and Pak, 2017). 
In an attempt to propose a wider perspective on this matter, this preliminary study has allowed 
to bridge some extant gaps in particular by both quantifying and examining all components of 
trade misinvoicing in the case of OECD-35 countries. In such context, the methodology followed 
to determine relevant empirical regularities has combined two approaches for assessing the 
scale of intra-OECD trade misinvoicing and the strength of certain bilateral intensity 
relationships, based on the mirror data technique. In an effort to provide insights in the extent 
and trends of these illegal practices, even in the cases of developed countries largely engaged 
in global trade, 1190 bilateral flows were analysed over an eleven-year span, based on UN 
COMTRADE data, to estimate amounts in each category of trade misinvoicing and to compute 
the respective bilateral intensity indexes.  
As a result, the size, direction and intensity of bilateral trade misinvoicing were emphasized to 
provide interesting findings on trends and patterns in intra-OECD mis-trade: (i) illicit financial 
flows exhibit substantial figures at an aggregate level associated, in most cases, to some 
advanced countries – Germany, Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United-Kingdom, the 
United-States; (ii) OECD’s trade misinvoicing is predominantly based on illicit financial inflows 
showing, however, a reverse trend in favour of illicit outflows in recent years; (iii) results 
obtained yield some regularities contrary to what have been supposed by the related-literature. 
For instance, countries with relatively low GDP per capita, such as Poland, Mexico and Turkey, 
are recipients of illicit inflows and countries with high GDP per capita – such as Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the United States – are shifting abroad illicit funds; (iv) bilateral intensity 
indexes relative to selected advanced countries indicate strengthened relations regarding trade 
misinvoicing between them and suggesting which channel is used to drive IFFs; and (v) trends 
over the period tend to demonstrate a consistent growth pattern, for all categories of 
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misinvoicing, notwithstanding the reduction of tariffs and the OECD’s increasing initiatives to 
curtail IFFs (OECD, 2014).  
In a nutshell, our findings can serve as a baseline for further improvements in current 
understanding of trade misinvoicing through more detailed analysis at a commodity level and 
discussions on trade statistics consistent with those provided by national statistical offices. 
Furthermore, given that trade misinvoicing relies increasingly on the service sector, refinements 
can be explored in this direction depending on available statistics.    
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Appendix 
Table 1-A: Synthetic data for OECD countries on average (2006-2016) 
 
Source: Authors ‘calculations 
 
Figure 1-A: Comparison of estimated values of trade misinvoicing for overall OECD in millions of US$ (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MISXo and MISXu denote export over- and under-invoicing; MISMo and MISMu refer to import over- and 
under-invoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE and IMF DOTS databases. 
  
Export share Import share Trade misinv.
Country in OECD trade in OECD trade Over Under Under Over in total misinv. in total exports in total misinv. in total imports in GDP
Codes (%) (%) (US$ bn. p.a) (US$ bn. p.a) (US$ bn. p.a) (US$ bn. p.a) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Australia AUS 1.30 1.62 4.9 6.1 2.4 7.6 51.2 13.3 48.8 10.2 1.8
Austria AUT 1.92 1.98 16.5 1.7 25.6 5.1 37.7 14.3 62.3 25.6 12.1
Belgium BEL 5.51 5.10 115.7 0.6 9.1 25.0 77.6 31.8 22.4 10.9 30.8
Canada CAN 5.36 5.16 24.4 11.4 10.7 31.3 44.8 9.9 55.2 13.3 4.8
Chile CHL 0.54 0.44 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.4 60.0 16.2 40.0 14.7 4.6
Czech Rep. CZE 1.90 1.47 24.9 1.4 20.2 4.7 51.2 20.7 48.8 27.8 25.3
Denmark DNK 1.17 1.13 8.8 2.9 8.3 1.3 54.4 15.1 45.6 14.1 6.5
Estonia EST 0.15 0.16 2.0 0.5 2.6 0.5 44.1 25.2 55.9 33.2 25.6
Finland FIN 0.79 0.74 2.5 3.4 11.4 1.3 31.9 11.2 68.1 28.3 7.3
France FRA 6.14 6.77 33.6 14.2 119.8 16.9 25.8 11.8 74.2 33.3 6.9
Germany DEU 15.93 12.31 159.5 5.8 118.5 44.5 50.4 15.7 49.6 21.8 9.3
Greece GRC 0.24 0.59 2.3 0.3 5.6 1.0 29.8 16.4 70.2 18.5 3.4
Hungary HUN 1.18 1.06 13.9 1.6 5.6 2.4 66.0 19.7 34.0 12.4 17.6
Iceland ISL 0.06 0.06 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.5 54.1 31.4 45.9 29.6 15.1
Ireland IRL 1.65 0.89 1.9 21.1 14.0 3.3 56.9 21.2 43.1 32.0 15.9
Israel ISR 0.60 0.59 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.5 42.5 17.2 57.5 23.5 6.1
Italy ITA 5.25 4.66 41.2 6.5 31.7 3.0 58.0 13.7 42.0 12.3 3.9
Japan JPN 4.80 3.74 18.8 32.9 6.5 18.6 67.3 16.4 32.7 11.1 1.5
Korea, Rep. KOR 2.51 2.65 10.3 13.0 7.4 4.3 66.6 14.0 33.4 7.2 3.0
Latvia LVA 0.09 0.13 1.4 1.1 1.9 0.1 55.5 40.0 44.5 23.8 15.7
Luxembourg LUX 0.19 0.29 0.8 3.7 6.0 0.4 41.6 35.0 58.4 36.7 19.6
Mexico MEX 4.45 4.00 35.7 18.8 0.7 32.9 61.5 18.4 38.5 14.2 8.0
Netherlands NLD 6.35 4.67 80.7 18.1 68.4 1.9 58.2 23.3 41.8 24.8 20.2
New Zealand NZL 0.26 0.29 0.2 1.4 2.4 1.4 28.9 9.2 71.1 21.7 3.4
Norway NOR 1.87 0.95 23.5 10.8 13.4 3.5 65.9 27.3 34.1 29.3 11.7
Poland POL 2.12 1.90 21.8 0.9 39.0 3.6 35.1 16.3 64.9 36.8 13.6
Portugal PRT 0.67 0.91 6.8 1.5 5.2 1.2 57.0 19.1 43.0 11.8 6.5
Slovakia SVK 0.92 0.68 13.3 0.6 15.2 2.5 44.2 22.3 55.8 42.0 34.2
Slovenia SVN 0.29 0.32 2.8 0.5 4.8 0.9 37.0 17.0 63.0 29.7 18.9
Spain ESP 3.17 3.39 22.8 2.4 40.4 6.0 35.3 11.9 64.7 22.6 5.2
Sweden SWE 1.95 1.91 15.6 2.6 10.0 5.9 53.5 14.2 46.5 13.7 6.7
Switzerland CHE 2.56 2.68 22.7 7.4 30.6 3.2 48.6 17.7 51.4 21.4 10.5
Turkey TUR 1.00 1.50 3.1 6.0 15.2 4.0 32.3 13.8 67.7 20.9 3.6
United Kingdom GBR 5.43 7.24 57.6 6.0 50.9 13.2 49.4 17.6 50.6 14.6 4.7
United States USA 11.67 18.01 22.7 64.2 109.6 17.7 40.8 11.3 59.2 11.6 1.4
Country
Export misinvoicing Import misinvoicing Export misinvoicing Import misinvoicing
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Figure 2-A: Trade in goods by region in % of total OECD trade, average (2006-2016). 
 
 
Notes: Geographical regions are defined according to the UNCTAD STAT classification as follows: America (Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, USA); Asia-Oceania (Australia, Israel, Japan, Korea Rep., Turkey, New Zealand); Euro area (Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, UK); Other-OECD (Czech Rep., Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on trade statistics from the WITS database. 
 
Table 2-A: Official Development Assistance and export overinvoicing in Gross National Income (per cent) for 2016 
 
Notes: Gross National Income (GNI) data were sourced from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) and 
export over-invoicing (MISXo) were estimated from the representative sample of OECD countries (including only 29 
members). 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on development financial data from the OECD-DAC. 
  
DAC Members
(current US$ bn) (current US$ bn) (%) (%)
Australia 3.28 4.69 0.28 0.40
Austria 1.64 18.68 0.42 4.78
Belgium 2.30 102.93 0.50 22.25
Canada 3.93 10.06 0.26 0.67
Czech Republic 0.26 27.50 0.14 15.12
Denmark 2.37 10.07 0.75 3.20
Finland 1.06 1.15 0.44 0.48
France 9.62 36.34 0.38 1.45
Germany 24.74 162.76 0.70 4.60
Greece 0.37 2.57 0.19 1.32
Hungary 0.20 14.01 0.17 11.73
Iceland 0.06 1.02 0.29 5.00
Ireland 0.80 2.70 0.33 1.11
Italy 5.09 37.16 0.27 1.99
Japan 10.42 19.27 0.20 0.38
Korea 2.25 9.81 0.16 0.69
Luxembourg 0.39 0.74 0.98 1.85
Netherlands 4.97 55.05 0.65 7.17
New Zealand 0.44 0.29 0.25 0.16
Norway 4.38 12.40 1.12 3.17
Poland 0.66 19.48 0.15 4.30
Portugal 0.34 7.95 0.17 3.97
Slovak Republic 0.11 14.35 0.12 16.41
Slovenia 0.08 4.25 0.19 9.82
Spain 4.28 27.93 0.35 2.26
Sweden 4.89 16.19 0.94 3.11
Switzerland 3.58 31.74 0.54 4.75
United Kingdom 18.05 51.40 0.70 1.99
United States 34.41 20.23 0.18 0.11
Total 144.96 722.73
ODA ODA/GNI MISXo MISXo/GNI 
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Figure 3-A: Trends in trade misinvoicing for selected countries, in billion US$(2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MISXo and MISXu stand for export over-invoicing and under-invoicing respectively and MISMo and MISMu for 
import over-invoicing and under-invoicing. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3-A: Bilateral intensity indexes of trade misinvoicing for Japan with selected trading partners (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MisXij and MisMij indicate export and import misinvoicing in values (in millions of US dollars), i being the 
country under study and j the partner. (*) denotes the hypothetical share. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
New Zealand Mis Xij 93 151 25 217 110 69 289 110 207 61 147
Mis Xij* 22 7 -4 -8 22 48 4 -8 -3 17 -21
Intensity Index 4.2 22.7 -6.2 -26.2 5.0 1.4 67.1 -13.7 -68.6 3.6 -7.0
Korea Rep. Mis Xij -3,064 -3,197 -4,078 -2,339 -3,910 -4,065 -3,016 -1,941 -2,633 -2,334 -3,084
Mis Xij* -156 -325 -420 -63 -404 -354 -184 -176 -215 -98 -234
Intensity Index 19.7 9.8 9.7 37.4 9.7 11.5 16.4 11.0 12.2 23.9 13.2
Chile Mis Xij 245 223 169 110 372 318 368 553 437 242 230
Mis Xij* -11 -54 -92 44 -68 -33 -35 -49 27 124 42
Intensity Index -21.3 -4.2 -1.8 2.5 -5.4 -9.7 -10.6 -11.3 16.4 2.0 5.4
United States Mis Xij -8,794 -9,785 -8,385 -5,847 -7,827 -7,167 -8,965 -8,563 -5,770 -3,638 -7,752
Mis Xij* 2,251 2,516 2,176 2,527 685 965 3,709 4,158 2,345 1,505 -372
Intensity Index -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 -2.3 -11.4 -7.4 -2.4 -2.1 -2.5 -2.4 20.9
Germany Mis Xij 7,002 7,360 6,695 6,287 6,285 8,136 6,442 6,034 5,042 4,925 5,407
Mis Xij* 979 806 2,805 1,384 774 403 2,927 3,266 3,017 3,057 1,451
Intensity Index 7.2 9.1 2.4 4.5 8.1 20.2 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 3.7
Poland Mis Xij 832 1,237 2,002 1,299 836 855 846 975 1,128 722 913
Mis Xij* 1,007 1,265 1,079 1,180 1,332 1,612 1,802 1,592 1,878 1,925 1,952
Intensity Index 0.8 1.0 1.9 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5
Denmark Mis Xij -187 -119 -138 -16 -61 -21 -30 -21 -68 -73 -42
Mis Xij* 251 55 117 242 184 137 167 180 255 257 199
Intensity Index -0.7 -2.2 -1.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2
Italy Mis Xij -218 -61 -107 136 -427 1 68 -177 -251 -478 -1,160
Mis Xij* 899 1,082 1,384 965 208 195 700 852 782 854 667
Intensity Index -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -2.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -1.7
Luxembourg Mis Xij -72 -90 128 182 114 154 70 130 81 -190 95
Mis Xij* 321 172 218 269 323 283 240 267 226 203 189
Intensity Index -0.2 -0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.9 0.5
Latvia Mis Xij -34 -43 -28 -11 -31 -29 -45 -37 -33 -32 -32
Mis Xij* 52 78 49 40 45 54 68 107 96 90 70
Intensity Index -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Australia Mis Mij 942 1,610 479 1,578 909 -553 1,638 15,135 608 1,802 1,321
Mis Mij* -168 -154 -62 -96 -64 -52 -137 -653 -220 -155 -41
Intensity Index -5.6 -10.5 -7.7 -16.4 -14.1 10.7 -12.0 -23.2 -2.8 -11.6 -32.6
Mexico Mis Mij 974 958 1,420 944 1,240 1,365 1,393 1,626 1,281 1,303 1,449
Mis Mij* 152 172 533 324 -45 -46 116 699 122 207 105
Intensity Index 6.4 5.6 2.7 2.9 -27.9 -29.5 12.0 2.3 10.5 6.3 13.8
France Mis Mij 1,015 1,221 1,421 1,679 1,571 1,695 2,165 1,583 1,371 1,646 2,374
Mis Mij* -103 -112 272 211 69 483 529 704 -339 -74 206
Intensity Index -9.8 -10.9 5.2 8.0 22.6 3.5 4.1 2.2 -4.0 -22.2 11.5
Korea Mis Mij -1,690 -1,546 -1,456 -1,786 -2,176 -3,487 -1,949 -2,096 -1,898 -1,206 -1,609
Mis Mij* -667 -434 -351 -220 -309 -268 -487 -55 -454 -170 -282
Intensity Index 2.5 3.6 4.2 8.1 7.0 13.0 4.0 38.3 4.2 7.1 5.7
Slovakia Mis Mij 41 55 59 78 61 86 61 64 69 53 93
Mis Mij* 187 236 389 325 282 407 556 605 464 430 400
Intensity Index 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.23
Czech Rep. Mis Mij -23 -62 -70 -39 -43 -5 -39 -145 -318 -233 -234
Mis Mij* 444 491 804 533 583 842 953 872 702 794 758
Intensity Index -0.05 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.17 -0.45 -0.29 -0.31
Germany Mis Mij -646 -251 1,014 166 164 -208 231 -1,209 -849 -502 -670
Mis Mij* 2,843 3,599 4,199 4,688 3,939 4,496 4,799 5,569 3,808 4,518 4,614
Intensity Index -0.23 -0.07 0.24 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.22 -0.22 -0.11 -0.15
Luxembourg Mis Mij -1 -3 -9 -9 -7 -2 -22 -14 -3 -4 -2
Mis Mij* -153 -139 -188 -111 -101 -121 -131 -110 -136 -111 -83
Intensity Index 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.02
Strong Relations
Weak relations
Weak relations
Strong Relations
 Exporter
Japan
Importer
Japan
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Table 4-A: Bilateral intensity indexes of trade misinvoicing for Mexico with selected trading partners (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MisXij and MisMij indicate export and import misinvoicing in values (in millions of US dollars), i being the 
country under study and j the partner. (*) denotes the hypothetical share. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
United States Mis Xij -29,859 -29,862 -35,552 -23,338 -27,721 -33,708 -35,827 -44,451 -48,812 -37,230 -33,158
Mis Xij* -3,783 -3,145 -3,876 -2,377 -2,786 -3,447 -2,427 -3,269 -6,583 -6,495 -5,195
Intensity Index 7.9 9.5 9.2 9.8 9.9 9.8 14.8 13.6 7.4 5.7 6.4
Turkey Mis Xij 202 277 282 238 314 448 430 552 530 566 508
Mis Xij* -284 -345 -353 -148 -49 -145 -133 -121 -178 -33 28
Intensity Index -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -1.6 -6.4 -3.1 -3.2 -4.6 -3.0 -17.1 18.0
Canada Mis Xij 8,955 9,572 9,774 6,295 10,801 14,120 14,609 15,505 15,357 13,873 14,648
Mis Xij* -2,680 -2,624 -2,913 -2,068 -2,746 -3,126 -3,643 -3,952 -4,271 -3,630 -3,181
Intensity Index -3.3 -3.6 -3.4 -3.0 -3.9 -4.5 -4.0 -3.9 -3.6 -3.8 -4.6
Austria Mis Xij 144 173 230 153 218 250 217 198 215 324 76
Mis Xij* -112 -91 -262 77 229 38 260 89 43 313 -204
Intensity Index -1.3 -1.9 -0.9 2.0 1.0 6.5 0.8 2.2 5.0 1.0 -0.4
Belgium Mis Xij 239 462 774 491 452 565 566 788 555 1,293 1,626
Mis Xij* -2,059 -2,190 -3,025 -2,139 -2,267 -3,191 -3,485 -5,285 -3,812 -2,287 -2,416
Intensity Index -0.12 -0.21 -0.26 -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.57 -0.67
Israel Mis Xij -61 -77 -116 21 73 47 20 16 2 -46 -45
Mis Xij* -102 -121 -203 -218 -219 -308 -353 -367 -488 -361 -488
Intensity Index 0.59 0.63 0.57 -0.10 -0.34 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.09
Hungary Mis Xij -2 2 -62 44 -42 -288 -147 -51 -24 -31 -70
Mis Xij* -251 -239 -387 -306 -304 -362 -398 -349 -415 -308 -233
Intensity Index 0.01 -0.01 0.16 -0.14 0.14 0.79 0.37 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.30
Portugal Mis Xij 16 5 24 34 29 -7 40 10 15 -17 -8
Mis Xij* -212 -275 -385 -232 -210 -22 -73 -219 -323 -241 -197
Intensity Index -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.14 0.32 -0.55 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.04
Sweden Mis Xij 3 -7 -5 1 16 12 -22 -23 -59 -59 -25
Mis Xij* -400 -514 -689 -445 -558 -763 -931 -858 -859 -672 -596
Intensity Index -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.04
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Korea Rep. Mis Mij 4,337 5,132 4,437 3,813 3,885 3,935 4,299 3,766 2,922 3,727 3,891
Mis Mij* 240 480 444 168 373 457 111 151 75 154 -34
Intensity Index 18.0 10.7 10.0 22.7 10.4 8.6 38.7 24.9 38.9 24.3 -113.2
Japan Mis Mij 6,019 6,092 6,334 4,573 5,440 6,264 7,083 7,385 6,910 6,893 7,088
Mis Mij* 918 1,091 1,015 55 506 321 -74 -440 -635 -655 -200
Intensity Index 6.6 5.6 6.2 82.4 10.8 19.5 -95.3 -16.8 -10.9 -10.5 -35.5
United States Mis Mij 16,287 20,570 20,253 7,071 13,633 14,932 10,851 6,125 3,243 1,995 3,808
Mis Mij* 1,012 1,517 1,574 373 611 442 -493 -850 -1,360 -1,186 -1,227
Intensity Index 16.1 13.6 12.9 19.0 22.3 33.8 -22.0 -7.2 -2.4 -1.7 -3.1
New Zealand Mis Mij 67 71 110 93 116 107 108 127 113 92 46
Mis Mij* 12 33 28 -10 -6 4 -5 -16 -48 -50 -46
Intensity Index 5.8 2.1 4.0 -9.2 -18.5 26.0 -21.5 -8.2 -2.4 -1.8 -1.0
Canada Mis Mij 3,830 3,946 4,579 3,932 4,427 4,923 4,499 4,569 5,215 4,992 4,153
Mis Mij* 1,647 1,946 1,965 706 973 1,112 2,137 1,727 481 377 283
Intensity Index 2.3 2.0 2.3 5.6 4.6 4.4 2.1 2.6 10.9 13.3 14.7
Poland Mis Mij 90 103 38 89 71 97 111 238 394 477 261
Mis Mij* 818 1,017 1,299 934 1,045 1,141 950 1,097 1,075 1,024 883
Intensity Index 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.30
Norway Mis Mij 193 174 120 55 141 47 37 60 33 76 46
Mis Mij* 758 1,054 1,512 348 561 773 855 837 592 331 317
Intensity Index 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.23 0.15
Netherlands Mis Mij -20 452 801 79 -11 43 -209 681 143 587 -82
Mis Mij* 3,159 3,824 4,549 2,969 3,669 2,239 3,447 2,782 2,920 2,813 1,862
Intensity Index -0.01 0.12 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 -0.04
Slovakia Mis Mij 20 -4 -42 9 24 29 47 89 91 62 127
Mis Mij* 375 497 614 413 470 608 733 737 731 677 615
Intensity Index 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.21
Belgium Mis Mij -86 -261 -368 -373 -375 -483 -494 -548 -342 -160 -309
Mis Mij* 4,435 5,108 5,515 4,090 4,711 5,183 5,045 6,251 4,781 4,619 4,633
Intensity Index -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07
Strong Relations
Weak relations
 Exporter
Mexico
Strong Relations
Weak relations
Importer
Mexico
33 
 
 
Table 5-A: Bilateral intensity indexes of trade misinvoicing for the United States with selected trading partners (2006-
2016) 
 
Notes: MisXij and MisMij indicate export and import misinvoicing in values (in millions of US dollars), i being the 
country under study and j the partner. (*) denotes the hypothetical share. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Chile Mis Xij -606 -460 -504 -1,419 -837 -853 -292 -1,457 -2,190 -3,344 -2,266
Mis Xij* 67 -22 -114 103 -86 -24 3 -154 30 331 208
Intensity Index -9.1 21.1 4.4 -13.8 9.7 35.6 -96.8 9.5 -72.6 -10.1 -10.9
New Zealand Mis Xij 10 65 531 461 173 42 307 436 508 523 480
Mis Xij* 147 107 68 -36 117 173 69 -24 -53 -13 -19
Intensity Index 0.1 0.6 7.8 -13.0 1.5 0.2 4.4 -18.5 -9.5 -40.4 -25.1
United Kingdom Mis Xij 7,293 9,698 8,992 5,502 7,688 6,231 7,375 8,309 6,919 4,299 4,392
Mis Xij* 344 3,395 5,194 2,305 768 1,356 6,484 5,593 3,480 3,374 4,977
Intensity Index 21.2 2.9 1.7 2.4 10.0 4.6 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.3 0.9
Switzerland Mis Xij -3,663 -6,527 -10,529 -7,160 -9,361 -11,892 1,031 554 3,203 1,437 4,591
Mis Xij* 2,505 3,179 4,102 3,618 5,130 9,408 47 1,610 1,288 1,999 1,434
Intensity Index -1.5 -2.1 -2.6 -2.0 -1.8 -1.3 22.1 0.3 2.5 0.7 3.2
Japan Mis Xij 7,482 7,732 10,330 8,008 7,173 8,307 6,593 5,667 5,108 5,127 5,789
Mis Xij* -1,266 -1,559 -2,884 -2,843 -3,056 -3,594 -3,643 -4,843 -2,905 -3,570 -3,227
Intensity Index -5.9 -5.0 -3.6 -2.8 -2.3 -2.3 -1.8 -1.2 -1.8 -1.4 -1.8
Sweden Mis Xij 120 239 82 60 -47 -5 -60 60 -220 -84 -39
Mis Xij* 1,063 765 384 76 -177 -567 -674 -295 -167 -299 -179
Intensity Index 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.78 0.26 0.01 0.09 -0.20 1.32 0.28 0.22
Luxemboug Mis Xij 53 -195 -340 -507 -421 -90 15 -4 75 355 -141
Mis Xij* 873 519 645 730 919 837 782 865 748 659 666
Intensity Index 0.06 -0.38 -0.53 -0.69 -0.46 -0.11 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.54 -0.21
Estonia Mis Xij 18 83 103 29 68 4 23 63 71 54 86
Mis Xij* 365 311 323 99 135 210 317 260 267 300 319
Intensity Index 0.05 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.51 0.02 0.07 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.27
Poland Mis Xij 644 137 198 948 1,248 1,352 1,365 1,465 1,489 1,285 1,731
Mis Xij* 2,935 3,668 3,365 3,165 3,953 4,800 5,789 5,152 6,256 6,352 6,771
Intensity Index 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.26
Slovakia Mis Xij 75 -52 350 391 310 388 340 408 438 415 450
Mis Xij* 685 1,028 838 1,340 1,861 2,359 2,250 1,809 1,995 1,960 2,434
Intensity Index 0.11 -0.05 0.42 0.29 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.18
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Mexico Mis Mij -29,859 -29,862 -35,552 -23,338 -27,721 -33,708 -35,827 -44,451 -48,812 -37,230 -33,158
Mis Mij* -5,455 -5,751 -5,107 -4,811 -7,656 -8,144 -11,234 -10,511 -7,857 -7,752 -8,402
Intensity Index 5.5 5.2 7.0 4.9 3.6 4.1 3.2 4.2 6.2 4.8 3.9
United Kingdom Mis Mij -9,823 -12,468 -10,859 -8,891 -12,582 -15,492 -12,168 -13,469 -11,652 -15,847 -11,429
Mis Mij* 6,648 -5,222 -6,311 -4,358 -1,756 2,208 -6,254 -7,687 -3,035 1,729 1,150
Intensity Index -1.5 2.4 1.7 2.0 7.2 -7.0 1.9 1.8 3.8 -9.2 -9.9
Estonia Mis Mij -146 -214 -403 -362 112 -297 -720 -249 -311 -206 471
Mis Mij* -288 -76 93 47 -33 -168 79 -38 -228 65 -139
Intensity Index 0.5 2.8 -4.3 -7.7 -3.4 1.8 -9.1 6.6 1.4 -3.2 -3.4
Germany Mis Mij -15,088 -12,714 -12,621 -8,988 -10,366 -11,552 -12,981 -14,920 -13,650 -10,956 -12,908
Mis Mij* -7,508 -7,350 -11,471 -2,267 -5,473 -5,684 -12,307 -13,898 -3,757 4,398 3,999
Intensity Index 2.0 1.7 1.1 4.0 1.9 2.0 1.1 1.1 3.6 -2.5 -3.2
Canada Mis Mij -16,935 -21,860 -24,598 -12,910 -15,484 -19,634 -44,600 -45,111 -18,190 -11,246 -8,836
Mis Mij* -11,726 -10,647 -11,164 -8,487 -10,998 -11,274 -9,393 -10,512 -13,528 -10,427 -10,018
Intensity Index 1.4 2.1 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 4.7 4.3 1.3 1.1 0.9
Spain Mis Mij 2 -140 -613 -518 -570 -590 -890 -921 -583 677 157
Mis Mij* -5,056 -4,545 -5,123 -3,026 -4,263 -1,858 -4,221 -4,117 -2,663 -1,336 -860
Intensity Index 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.21 0.22 0.22 -0.51 -0.18
Turkey Mis Mij 188 274 183 256 256 381 115 421 716 1,198 1,109
Mis Mij* -2,688 -2,856 -2,656 -1,944 -2,503 -3,214 -3,649 -4,193 -4,077 -3,701 -3,905
Intensity Index -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 -0.10 -0.18 -0.32 -0.28
New Zealand Mis Mij 161 75 55 97 86 7 -177 -54 -22 146 253
Mis Mij* -907 -875 -925 -758 -911 -921 -1,060 -1,020 -1,055 -906 -848
Intensity Index -0.18 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01 0.17 0.05 0.02 -0.16 -0.30
Luxemboug Mis Mij 51 106 80 -2 55 -83 102 113 245 160 64
Mis Mij* -1,320 -1,270 -1,567 -969 -890 -992 -1,144 -1,227 -1,163 -1,072 -870
Intensity Index -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.21 -0.15 -0.07
Australia Mis Mij 181 -275 -252 6 -435 -423 -1,008 488 -157 -9 -72
Mis Mij* -2,891 -3,004 -3,435 -2,811 -2,941 -3,264 -4,683 -7,545 -3,577 -2,982 -2,194
Intensity Index -0.06 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.22 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03
Strong Relations
Weak relations
 Exporter
United States
Strong Relations
Weak relations
Importer
United States
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Table 6-A: Bilateral intensity indexes of trade misinvoicing for Germany with selected trading partners (2006-2016) 
 
Notes: MisXij and MisMij indicate export and import misinvoicing in values (in millions of US dollars), i being the 
country under study and j the partner. (*) denotes the hypothetical share. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
France Mis Xij -28,392 -36,202 -36,617 -34,074 -26,138 -30,712 -26,562 -27,124 -30,841 -26,540 -24,717
Mis Xij* 222 -1,582 537 -1,134 -2,007 -2,922 -3,120 -1,424 -1,798 -1,365 -1,914
Intensity Index -127.9 22.9 -68.2 30.1 13.0 10.5 8.5 19.1 17.2 19.4 12.9
Poland Mis Xij -9,083 -13,737 -14,005 -13,758 -16,071 -18,278 -17,323 -16,187 -20,583 -18,859 -19,599
Mis Xij* -225 -278 -851 -596 198 544 1,373 702 1,436 1,714 2,230
Intensity Index 40.3 49.3 16.5 23.1 -81.3 -33.6 -12.6 -23.0 -14.3 -11.0 -8.8
Luxembourg Mis Xij -947 -780 -596 -2,229 -2,870 -2,994 -2,195 -2,028 -1,874 -1,657 -1,731
Mis Xij* 268 -174 61 213 395 183 55 191 52 66 90
Intensity Index -3.5 4.5 -9.8 -10.5 -7.3 -16.3 -40.0 -10.6 -35.8 -25.0 -19.3
Netherlands Mis Xij -7,611 -8,660 -4,703 -8,747 -12,776 -20,242 -18,061 -17,910 -20,838 -21,392 -20,810
Mis Xij* 501 -797 -1,617 -4,269 -2,330 860 -1,835 -2,577 -3,645 -3,114 -421
Intensity Index -15.2 10.9 2.9 2.0 5.5 -23.5 9.8 6.9 5.7 6.9 49.5
Finland Mis Xij -2,854 -3,752 -2,672 -1,783 -2,132 -1,360 -2,050 -2,174 -2,398 -1,786 -2,301
Mis Xij* 82 -246 -91 -540 -281 -1,216 -88 -330 -551 -359 -309
Intensity Index -34.7 15.2 29.4 3.3 7.6 1.1 23.4 6.6 4.4 5.0 7.4
Canada Mis Xij 1,747 2,064 2,935 2,255 2,432 2,618 2,725 3,088 2,812 2,475 2,423
Mis Xij* -14,325 -16,199 -15,724 -14,032 -15,923 -17,880 -17,660 -18,128 -19,112 -16,975 -16,272
Intensity Index -0.12 -0.13 -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
Korea Mis Xij -330 331 902 145 -589 -880 -1,063 -1,512 -1,475 -832 -2,120
Mis Xij* -4,548 -5,938 -5,902 -5,686 -6,510 -7,372 -6,631 -6,843 -7,783 -6,870 -6,206
Intensity Index 0.07 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.34
Mexico Mis Xij 1,396 1,673 2,611 2,764 1,882 2,273 2,062 1,513 1,663 1,645 1,333
Mis Xij* -13,797 -16,106 -16,106 -12,356 -14,625 -16,618 -16,079 -15,913 -16,564 -15,857 -15,368
Intensity Index -0.10 -0.10 -0.16 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
Australia Mis Xij 171 542 478 -163 -399 -645 -449 -504 311 -104 -38
Mis Xij* -4,267 -5,442 -5,408 -4,545 -5,388 -5,049 -5,654 -4,545 -5,335 -4,660 -4,981
Intensity Index -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.01
Japan Mis Xij -646 -251 1,014 166 164 -208 231 -1,209 -849 -502 -670
Mis Xij* -8,985 -10,301 -11,636 -11,069 -11,326 -13,406 -13,269 -13,607 -11,739 -10,905 -10,914
Intensity Index 0.07 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06
Trading partners
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Hungary Mis Mij -3,887 -4,256 -5,211 -3,189 -3,691 -4,524 -4,140 -4,247 -4,297 -3,379 -3,239
Mis Mij* -53 39 -186 382 69 725 183 -83 -123 -302 -96
Intensity Index 72.9 -110.4 27.9 -8.4 -53.1 -6.2 -22.7 50.9 34.9 11.2 33.6
Czech Rep. Mis Mij -5,387 -4,479 -8,111 -4,841 -6,534 -10,495 -11,169 -10,715 -11,323 -11,043 -9,691
Mis Mij* 774 858 540 588 400 1,286 642 -93 432 733 703
Intensity Index -7.0 -5.2 -15.0 -8.2 -16.3 -8.2 -17.4 114.8 -26.2 -15.1 -13.8
Austria Mis Mij -8,067 -6,358 -8,097 -4,069 -4,618 -5,153 -5,438 -4,741 -5,899 -5,412 -5,664
Mis Mij* 319 82 -330 -166 -781 -724 -1,605 -1,832 -1,697 -1,233 -236
Intensity Index -25.3 -77.7 24.5 24.5 5.9 7.1 3.4 2.6 3.5 4.4 24.0
Netherlands Mis Mij -29,779 -32,185 -46,062 -31,354 -36,873 -22,939 -36,258 -34,228 -32,232 -21,419 -15,216
Mis Mij* 1,293 2,712 1,340 3,646 2,218 -3,750 -1,835 -4,161 -2,140 -692 -2,408
Intensity Index -23.0 -11.9 -34.4 -8.6 -16.6 6.1 19.8 8.2 15.1 30.9 6.3
Poland Mis Mij -5,447 -5,791 -8,175 -6,792 -6,666 -7,890 -6,143 -7,466 -7,681 -7,176 -6,232
Mis Mij* 327 565 208 1,183 193 337 -1,081 -853 -758 -762 -899
Intensity Index -16.7 -10.2 -39.3 -5.7 -34.5 -23.4 5.7 8.7 10.1 9.4 6.9
Turkey Mis Mij 852 123 -127 675 454 934 989 1,162 1,097 1,214 1,460
Mis Mij* -1,438 -1,605 -2,040 -1,180 -1,678 -2,101 -2,272 -2,723 -2,818 -2,553 -2,589
Intensity Index -0.59 -0.08 0.06 -0.57 -0.27 -0.44 -0.44 -0.43 -0.39 -0.48 -0.56
New Zealand Mis Mij 247 270 225 169 194 297 158 136 252 226 247
Mis Mij* -507 -511 -713 -511 -626 -600 -662 -659 -729 -618 -561
Intensity Index -0.49 -0.53 -0.32 -0.33 -0.31 -0.49 -0.24 -0.21 -0.35 -0.37 -0.44
Israel Mis Mij -74 127 21 245 349 417 327 214 247 308 222
Mis Mij* -497 -631 -938 -723 -930 -971 -1,445 -1,412 -1,075 -1,147 -796
Intensity Index 0.15 -0.20 -0.02 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43 -0.23 -0.15 -0.23 -0.27 -0.28
Canada Mis Mij 1,430 1,129 1,050 1,033 1,494 2,889 1,601 1,772 1,990 1,413 1,428
Mis Mij* -5,642 -5,041 -8,524 -4,915 -7,129 -6,672 -5,152 -6,199 -9,416 -7,581 -6,786
Intensity Index -0.25 -0.22 -0.12 -0.21 -0.21 -0.43 -0.31 -0.29 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21
Mexico Mis Mij 472 544 620 853 876 1,187 622 1,058 943 1,073 1,307
Mis Mij* -2,202 -2,339 -3,860 -2,335 -4,813 -4,608 -6,624 -6,382 -5,530 -5,968 -5,791
Intensity Index -0.21 -0.23 -0.16 -0.37 -0.18 -0.26 -0.09 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.23
Strong Relations
Weak relations
 Exporter
Germany
Strong Relations
Weak relations
Importer
Germany
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